Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off by Pasachoff, Eloise
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2014 
Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of 
the Funding Cut-Off 
Eloise Pasachoff 
Georgetown University Law Center, eloise.pasachoff@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




124 Yale L.J 248-335 (2014) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the State 
and Local Government Law Commons 









E L O I S E  P A S A C H O F F   
 
Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes:  
A Defense of the Funding Cut-Off 
abstract.  This Article contends that federal agencies ought more frequently to use the 
threat of cutting off funds to state and local grantees that are not adequately complying with the 
terms of a grant statute. Scholars tend to offer four arguments to explain—and often to justify—
agencies’ longstanding reluctance to engage in funding cut-offs: first, that funding cut-offs will 
hurt the grant program’s beneficiaries and so will undermine the agency’s ultimate goals; se-
cond, that federalism concerns counsel against federal agencies’ taking funds away from state 
and local grantees; third, that agencies are neither designed nor motivated to pursue funding 
cut-offs; and fourth, that political dynamics among state governments, Congress, the White 
House, and the agencies themselves make funding cut-offs difficult to achieve. This Article ar-
gues that these critiques are deeply flawed. Among other problems, the critiques fail to account 
for the variety of types of grants, grant conditions, and rationales for grantee noncompliance; 
reflect lack of a nuanced understanding of the ways in which distinct federalism concerns play 
different roles at different times in the development and implementation of grant programs; and 
unrealistically assume static and unified agency incentives and political relationships. After de-
bunking these critiques, the Article offers a new conception of the potential benefit of funding 
cut-offs in the enforcement of federal grant programs: the threat of a funding cut-off may be ap-
propriate when it can promote change by the noncompliant grantee and when it can signal to 
other grantees that the agency is serious about enforcement, thereby increasing grantees’ compli-
ance. The Article concludes by assessing the implications of this argument for administrative re-
gime design and judicial review. This work opens up new avenues for research in administrative 
law on the distinct features of the federal grants regime. 
 
author.  Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. For helpful comments 
and conversations, I thank Lisa Bressman, John DiPaolo, Lilian Faulhaber, Brian Galle, Lisa 
Heinzerling, Martha Minow, John Monahan, Mitt Regan, Aaron Saiger, Sasha Samberg-
Champion, Miriam Seifter, Jason Snyder, David Super, David Vladeck, Tim Westmoreland, and 
the editors of the Yale Law Journal. I also benefitted from exchanges with participants in faculty 
workshops at the Georgetown University Law Center and at American University’s Washington 
College of Law, in a session at the Education Law Association annual conference, and in the 
Georgetown University Law Center-George Washington University Law School Junior Scholars 
Summer Workshop. For useful research assistance, I thank Georgetown students Tommy Ball, 
Kate St. Romain, and especially Sam Kramer, as well as Morgan Stoddard and her assistants at 
the Georgetown Law Library. I also thank Johnny Wong and Angie Villareal for ongoing admin-
istrative support.  
  








article  contents  
introduction 251	  
i.	   disaggregating the intergovernmental grant system 260	  
A.	  The Scope of Grant-Making in the Federal Regulatory State 260	  
B.	  Types of Grants, Grant Conditions, and Grantee Noncompliance 266	  
1.	   Types of Grants 267	  
2.	   Types of Grant Conditions 271	  
3.	   Types of Grantee Noncompliance 273	  
C.	  The Agency Role in Grant Oversight 276	  
1.	   Application 276	  
2.	   Monitoring and Oversight 278	  
3.	   Enforcement 280	  
ii.	   deconstructing the case against funding cut-offs 283	  
A.	  Hurting Grant Beneficiaries 285	  
1.	   The Variety of Limitations on Withholding 286	  
2.	   The Variety of Types of Grants 287	  
3.	   The Baseline 288	  
4.	   Comparisons to Other Compliance Mechanisms 289	  
5.	   Other Consequences of Program Noncompliance 291	  
B.	  Undercutting Federalism 293	  
1.	   Protecting Sovereignty and Autonomy 294	  
2.	   Preventing Coercion 297	  
3.	   Promoting Diversity 300	  
4.	   Enhancing Accountability 302	  
C.	  The Limits of Agency Motivation and Capacity 304	  
1.	   Motivation 304	  
2.	   Capacity 307	  
3.	   Motivation, Capacity, and the Special Case of Coercion 309	  
D.	  The Limits of Politics 312	  
1.	   General Applicability of the Critique 313	  
2.	   Distinctions Among Grants and Grant Types 314	  
3.	   Complexities of Political Alignment 315	  
  
the yale law journal 124:248   20 14  
250 
 
iii. rethinking funding cut-offs 317	  
A.	  Circumstances Most (and Least) Inviting Funding Cut-Offs 317	  
1.	   Rationales for Grantee Noncompliance 319	  
2.	   Types of Conditions 320	  
3.	   Types of Grants 321	  
B.	  Administrative Regime Design 322	  
1.	   OMB 322	  
2.	   Agency Grant Program Offices 326	  
3.	   Congress 328	  








The Spending Clause authorizes the federal government to spend in sup-
port of the “general Welfare.”1 Such spending often comes in the form of stat-
utes that authorize federal grants to state and local governments.2 As a result of 
these statutes, grant relationships between federal agencies and their state and 
local counterparts are pervasive. In 2013, federal grants to state and local gov-
ernments constituted almost 16% of the federal budget3 and almost one-
quarter of all state and local expenditures.4 Every cabinet-level agency except 
the State Department made such grants.5 Approximately 80% of federal grants 
each year go to state and local governments.6 But what happens when states 
and localities fail to comply with the conditions placed on the funding? 
 
1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  
2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 12-1016, GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS 7 (2012) [hereinafter GAO], http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648792.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/5Q77-CPNS]. A grant is a “form of federal assistance consisting of payments in 
cash or in kind to a state or local government or a nongovernmental recipient for a specified 
purpose.” Id. at 2-3; see also 31 U.S.C. § 6501(4)(A)-(B) (2012) (defining a grant as “money, 
or property provided instead of money, that is paid or provided by the United States Gov-
ernment under a fixed annual or total authorization” to an eligible beneficiary). 
3. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 245 tbl.15-1  
(2014) [hereinafter OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/BUDGET-2015-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2015-PER.pdf [http://perma.cc/S739-JZ65]. 
4. Id. 
5. Cf. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 289-98 tbl.17-1 (2013) 
[hereinafter OMB, FY14 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES] (presenting summary statistics for FY12 
actual and FY13 and FY14 estimated budget authority and outlays in federal grants to state 
and local governments for every cabinet agency except the State Department). Compare LISA 
SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 3 (2d ed. 2013) (listing  
cabinet departments), with Prime Award Spending Data 2013, USASPENDING.GOV,  
http://www.usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=detailsummary&fisc
al_year=2013 [http://perma.cc/ZTF8-E82B] (listing grant amounts given by each agency). 
The State Department did award approximately $1.6 billion in grants in 2013, but the recipi-
ents were largely non-profit, citizen-exchange programs, foreign governments, non-
governmental organizations, and so on. See Prime Award Spending Data 2013: U.S. Depart-
ment of State, USASPENDING.GOV, http://usaspending.gov/advanced-search [http://perma 
.cc/QAY3-TQDX] (search “Spending Type” for “Grants,” search “Department/Agency 
(Code - Name)” for “1900 - State, Department of,” and search “Fiscal Year” for “2013”; then 
follow “Search” hyperlink) [http://perma.cc/3LVV-A8HR]; Congressional Budget Justifica-
tion, Volume 1: Department of State Operations, U.S. DEP’T STATE (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207266.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UHJ-YJS2]. 
6. See GAO, supra note 2, at 7. 
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This is not merely a theoretical question. In just the last few years, states 
have failed to comply with requirements of the food stamps grant program by 
improperly terminating benefits to tens of thousands of food stamp recipients 
and doing very little to attempt to correct the errors.7 States have failed to 
comply with requirements of the Medicaid grant program by placing limits on 
the number of annual emergency room visits that Medicaid recipients can 
make.8 States have failed to comply with the federal special education grant 
program, reducing state spending on special education below what the terms of 
the grant require.9 States have failed to implement procedures that they agreed 
to take on when they accepted federal education funds under Race to the Top 
and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund.10 Localities have failed to comply with 
the terms of federal housing grants by declining to put in place antidiscrimina-
tion measures in their housing programs.11 What should the federal agencies in 
charge of the grant money do? 
If agencies and their grantees cannot reach an agreement through persua-
sion and other informal means, agencies have a powerful formal tool at their 
disposal: they can cut off funds to the offending grantee until the grantee com-
plies.12 This tool can be very effective. For example, it is widely understood that 
the use (and threatened use) of funding cut-offs played a significant role in de-
segregating Southern schools in the late 1960s.13 Notwithstanding this exam-
 
7. See David A. Super, An Error Message for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/opinion/an-error-message-for-the-poor.html [http:// 
perma.cc/6VNV-LJZW]. 
8. See Jodie Tillman & Tia Mitchell, Feds to Fine State over Limit on Medicaid Patients’  
ER Visits, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.tampabay 
.com/news/politics/legislature/feds-to-fine-state-over-limit-on-medicaid-patients-er-visits 
/2167575 [http://perma.cc/6U3Z-3RJN]. 
9. See S.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. Duncan, 714 F.3d 249, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2013). 
10. See Michele McNeil, Calif. Forgoes Data Grant, Jeopardizes Other Stimulus Funds, EDUC. WK.: 
POLITICS K-12 (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k 
-12/2011/08/with_browns_veto_calif_jeopard.html [http://perma.cc/Z3KC-KKS4]; Michele 
McNeil, U.S. Dept. of Ed. Plans to Withhold Part of Georgia’s Race to Top Grant, EDUC. WK.: 
POLITICS K-12 (July 30, 2013, 2:57 PM) http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k 
-12/2013/07/us_dept_of_ed_plans_to_withhol.html [http://perma.cc/FBV7-LZY8]. 
11. See Peter Applebome, Showdown for Westchester and U.S. Over Desegregation Agreement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/nyregion/us-gives-westchester 
-deadline-to-comply-with-housing-pact.html [http://perma.cc /V29W-AB53]. 
12. 2 RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY, 
AND PRACTICE § 8:04 (Supp. 1991). 
13. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 419 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“Although funding cutoffs have been rare, the threat of such cutoffs has been thought to be 
the strongest weapon against local officials in the effort to desegregate public schools.”); 
Elizabeth Cascio et al., Paying for Progress: Conditional Grants and the Desegregation of South-
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ple, however, the funding cut-off is a controversial mechanism that is rarely 
employed.14 Advocates periodically call for greater agency use of the funding 
cut-off,15 and agencies do sometimes employ this mechanism;16 however, the 
funding cut-off is generally disfavored, even by those who wish for greater en-
forcement overall.17 
Scholars tend to provide four arguments to either justify or explain the 
relative infrequency of funding cut-offs. First, the argument goes, the funding 
cut-off is a blunt tool that hurts the intended beneficiaries of the grant in ques-
tion.18 Second, the argument continues, federalism concerns justifiably limit 
agencies’ willingness to take money away from state and local grantees.19 Fed-
eralism concerns received enhanced attention after the Supreme Court held in 
2012 that the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid represented an un-
constitutional coercion of state governments because it threatened to cut off 
funds for the entire Medicaid program in states that declined to participate in 
the expansion.20 Scholars have generally suggested that NFIB v. Sebelius shifted 
power to states and away from agencies in the grant relationship.21 
 
ern Schools, 125 Q. J. ECON. 445, 449 (2010) (finding that, in the 1960s, “districts responded 
to financial pressure to desegregate in a historically meaningful way”).  
14. V.O. KEY, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES 156 (1937) (explaining 
that, several decades into the regime of federal grant-making, “[t]he power to withhold or 
suspend federal grants” is a “formidable weapon” that “has rarely been invoked”); Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 409 (2008) 
(observing that “the threat that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best”); Eloise Pa-
sachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 
62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 660 (2013) (describing agency reluctance to cut off funds as “a trans-
agency reality”). 
15. See, e.g., Fight for the Soul of the Cities, LAB./CMTY. STRATEGY CTR., http://www 
.fightforthesoulofthecities.com/campaigns [http://perma.cc/E8NF-WZ49] (calling for  
federal agencies to withhold grant funds under civil rights laws); National Opportunity  
to Learn Campaign: Federal Recommendations, SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC.  
11 (May 2009), http://schottfoundation.org/otl/otl-federal-recommendations-final.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UF86-RAU6] (calling for the Department of Education to withhold edu-
cation grants from noncompliant states and districts). 
16. See, e.g., CAPPALLI, supra note 12, § 8:06 (describing early cases of such agency action); Ba-
genstos, supra note 14, at 409 n.337 (acknowledging occasional instances of agencies’ cutting 
off funds). 
17. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 
200 (critiquing funding cut-offs as a tool while lamenting the Supreme Court’s restrictions 
on private enforcement). 
18. See infra Part II.A. 
19. See infra Part II.B. 
20. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
21. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After 
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 921 (2013); Erin Ryan, Environmental Law After Sebelius: Will the 
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The third argument posits that agencies have little motivation or capacity 
to cut off funds from their grantees; this argument seeks to explain (more than 
justify) the paucity of such enforcement actions. Grant program offices are de-
signed to give out money, not to take it away, and in any event they are too 
cash-strapped to be effective enforcers.22 The final argument, again more de-
scriptive than normative, further asserts that the political dynamics among 
states, Congress, agencies, and the White House do not support robust cut-off 
efforts.23 
In this Article, I contend that these arguments are deeply flawed. Moreover, 
even if they accurately describe what agency officials believe to be the case, they 
rest on unsupportable premises. As I demonstrate below, funding cut-offs will 
not always hurt a grant’s beneficiaries.24 The point of the mechanism is to en-
courage the noncompliant grantee to comply. Beneficiaries may at times be 
better off if a cut-off induces greater compliance in the future, as may benefi-
ciaries in other jurisdictions where grantees increase their compliance, having 
observed that the agency is serious about cutting off funds. Second, the feder-
alism concerns about the funding cut-off are misguided.25 It is more respectful 
of state sovereignty, not less, to hold states to their agreements. Many viola-
tions of grant conditions have nothing to do with state policy choices and more 
to do with poor administration. Several objectives promoted by federalism—
protecting sovereignty, preventing coercion, and promoting diversity—are 
more relevant to the front end of grant design and initial bargaining than to 
back-end grant enforcement. Furthermore, the objective that is relevant to the 
back end of grant enforcement—promoting accountability—is actually sup-
ported, not undermined, by a funding cut-off. 
As to the third argument—that agencies have little motivation or capacity 
to cut off funds from their grantees—some agency officials have an enforce-
ment mindset due to their perception of their core professional obligations, so 
claims about limited agency motivation are overstated. Relatedly, agency offi-
cials might appreciate the increased leverage that comes from a threatened 
funding cut-off, benefit from future job opportunities as a result of taking a 
hard line on enforcement, or value acting in collusion with state or local grant-
 
Court’s New Spending Power Limits Affect Environmental State-Federal Partnerships?,  
AM. CONST. SOC’Y 19 (Oct. 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Ryan-_After 
_Sebelius.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTV5-PEE7]. 
22. See infra Part II.C. 
23. See infra Part II.D. 
24. See infra Part II.A. 
25. See infra Part II.B. 
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ees against other recalcitrant players in the system.26 Claims about limited 
agency capacity to cut off funds insufficiently acknowledge that the alterna-
tive—private litigation against non-compliant grantees—also faces serious 
practical constraints.27 NFIB does little to change the analysis.28 Most grant 
conditions are unlikely to be found coercive, even under the new doctrine set 
forth in that case,29 and, in any event, other forms of intergovernmental nego-
tiation that scholars have predicted in the wake of NFIB are similarly time-
intensive. Finally, political dynamics are complicated; multiple alignments of 
shifting political coalitions are possible.30 The suggestion that states will always 
or even usually prevail in a battle with agency enforcers misses multiple layers 
of complexity in the relationships at issue. 
In debunking these standard critiques and in suggesting the potential value 
of the funding cut-off, I have two goals. The first goal is to clear the brush 
away from the mechanism so that analysts, advocates, and agency officials may 
evaluate its potential use on the merits of each case rather than with doubt 
about or distaste for the mechanism itself. The rehabilitation of this agency en-
forcement mechanism is an important task, especially as the scope of intergov-
ernmental grants is vast and has only increased over time.31 Although the ex-
tent of noncompliance is unknown, it is fair to say that state and local 
government grantees have not always complied with the conditions they 
agreed to when accepting federal money.32 Agency enforcement of these pro-
grams is particularly important in light of the various restrictions the Supreme 
Court has placed on private enforcement of federal grant regimes over the last 
two decades. The Court has interpreted particular grant statutes and their as-
sociated conditions narrowly, making it more difficult for private parties to es-
 
26. See infra Part II.C.1. 
27. See infra Part II.C.2. 
28. See infra Part II.C.3. 
29. See generally Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 612-51 (arguing that federal education laws, the next 
likely target after Medicaid because of their scope, would all survive a coercion analysis un-
der the new doctrine). 
30. See infra Part II.D. 
31. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; infra notes 43-45, 52-73 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; infra notes 139-155 and accompanying text; see 
also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local 
Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1226, 1228 n.90 (1999) (de-
scribing the “familiar point that state and local officials frequently . . . violat[e] conditions 
attached to federal funds whenever the federal government fails to monitor their compli-
ance” and giving an example of a governor’s description of his decision to “just start[] ig-
noring all the federal rules”). 
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tablish violations or bring suit at all.33 The Court has constrained lower courts’ 
ability to read private rights of action into grant programs.34 It has limited the 
circumstances under which attorneys’ fees may be available.35 It has made civil 
litigation generally more difficult by, among other things, tightening pleading 
standards36 and class action requirements.37 Together, these doctrinal devel-
opments have left a significant enforcement gap surrounding the use of hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in federal grant money each year. The other poten-
tial players in the enforcement regime are the agencies. As of yet, however, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the potential upsides of agency enforce-
ment of grant programs, much less ways to design agency process and struc-
ture to capitalize on these upsides. This Article takes on that task. 
The second goal of the Article is to highlight the fact that grant administra-
tion and enforcement are part of the core work of federal agencies. This work 
rarely appears in descriptions or analyses of the administrative state’s func-
 
33. See, e.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that the burden 
of proof in a challenge under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act lies with the 
party seeking relief—which in most cases will be the disabled child); Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that individuals may sue under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 only for acts of intentional discrimination, not for acts that only have a disparate 
impact). 
34. See, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (declining to 
allow a Supremacy Clause action to enforce a provision of the Medicaid grant in light of 
agency action); see also id. at 1212 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that he and three other 
Justices would reach the question the Court skirts and hold that the Supremacy Clause nev-
er provides a cause of action to enforce a grant condition where the grant statute does not 
provide an individual cause of action in the statute itself); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 
273, 276 (2002) (holding that a law conditioned on federal grant funds may not be enforced 
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
(FERPA) created no individually enforceable right). 
35. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 600, 610 (2001) (holding that attorneys’ fees may be awarded under a fee-shifting 
provision only if the prevailing party obtained a material alteration in the legal relationship 
between the parties, not if the plaintiff’s suit was merely a catalyst for the change the plain-
tiff had sought). 
36. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that, if anti-
trust complaints are to survive a motion to dismiss, they must meet a “plausibility” re-
quirement). 
37. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52, 2557 (2011) (restricting standards 
for certifying a class for class action litigation). 
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tions.38 Federal grants tend to appear in the legal literature in two lines of 
scholarship: analyses of doctrine related to the Spending Clause39 or broader 
discussions of federalism.40 Neither of these sets of literature, however, attends 
to the unique administrative law features of grants.41 Even the recent scholar-
ship on administrative federalism, which analyzes the relationship between 
federal agencies and the states, pays scant attention to the particular role of 
federal grants in these relationships, focusing instead on matters such as 
preemption, which have little relevance in the world of federal grants.42 
The absence of attention to federal grants as a distinct category of adminis-
trative action is surprising in light of the category’s importance. Consider these 
 
38. For example, Justice Breyer’s classic administrative law casebook includes no discussion of 
grants in its historical survey of administrative government and law, nor does grant-making 
feature in the book’s discussion of “What Is an Agency and What Does It Do?” STEPHEN G. 
BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 
15-36 (7th ed. 2011). Other administrative law casebooks suffer from the same omission.  
A handful of practitioner compendiums on grants exist, see KENNETH J. ALLEN, FEDERAL 
GRANT PRACTICE (2014 ed.); CAPPALLI, supra note 12; PAUL G. DEMBLING & MALCOLM S. MA-
SON, ESSENTIALS OF GRANT LAW PRACTICE (1991); THOMPSON’S FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGE-
MENT HANDBOOK (2014), but their practice-oriented approach has not provoked much 
scholarship. A rare instance of a sustained discussion of grants as a distinct form of adminis-
trative action appears in Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1315-17, 1320-21 (2003), but even there, the analysis focuses on using 
grants to make privatized government services more public, rather than on anything specific 
to the grants regime itself. 
39. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14; Bagenstos, supra note 21; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. 
Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a 
Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L. J. 459 (2003); Brian Galle, Federal 
Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2008) [hereinafter Galle, Federal Grants]; Brian 
Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Con-
ditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004); Ilya Somin, Closing the Pando-
ra’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 
90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002). 
40. See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 288–90 (2012); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1274-76, 
1282, 1297 (2008); Hills, supra note 32; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Coop-
erative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 813, 858-65 (1998); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2544, 2571-93 (2005). 
41. Of course, individual grant programs receive scholarly attention relating to the specifics of 
that statutory regime, but those analyses do not address the more general administrative law 
issues that accompany the grant regime writ large, as this Article begins to do. See also infra 
note 49 (describing my anticipated subsequent work in this area). 
42. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 
(2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(2011); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 2125 (2009). 
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facts: The cabinet agency that gives the least money in grants each year, the 
Treasury Department, in 2012 nonetheless provided more in grant money than 
did the MacArthur Foundation, a giant in American private philanthropy.43 
The Environmental Protection Agency, better known for its work in direct reg-
ulation than in grants, provided $1.5 billion more in grant money in 2012 than 
did the Gates Foundation, the largest private grant-making institution in the 
world.44 And the cabinet agency that gives the most money in grants each year, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, provided more grant money in 
2012 than any individual state spent on its entire budget.45 In addition, both 
Congress and the White House have focused on the structure of the federal 
grants process in recent years,46 while the Supreme Court’s increased attention 
to Spending Clause doctrine47 and significant restrictions on private enforce-
ment of federal grants48 make the task of understanding the administrative 
structure of federal grants that much more critical. 
Given the size of—and increased political and judicial attention to—the 
federal grant-making universe, the legal literature needs to develop a nuanced 
account of the role of federal grants in administrative practice. In attending to 
 
43. The Treasury Department gave $221.3 million in grants in FY 2012. See Prime Award  
Spending Data, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal 
=yes&typeofview=detailsummary&fiscal_year=2012 [http://perma.cc /K5W9-CFM5] [here-
inafter Prime Award Spending Data 2012]. The MacArthur Foundation provided nearly $210 
million in grants in 2012. See The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, FOUND. 
CTR., https://fdo.foundationcenter.org [http://perma.cc /KCU3-L8TS] (search “Grantmak-
er Name” for “The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation”; then follow “MacAr-
thur Foundation, John D. and Catherine T, The” hyperlink). I use 2012 data in this example 
because it is the latest year for which final figures on foundation grant-making are available. 
44. The EPA gave $4.6 billion in grants in FY 2012. Prime Award Spending Data 2012, supra note 
43. The Gates Foundation gave $3.2 billion in grants that same year. See Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, FOUND. CTR., https://fdo.foundationcenter.org [http://perma.cc/KCU3-L8TS] 
(search “Grantmaker Name” for “Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation”; then follow “Gates 
Foundation, Bill & Melinda” hyperlink). 
45. HHS gave $344.4 billion in grants in FY 2012. See Prime Award Spending Data 2012, supra 
note 43. California, the state with the largest expenditures in FY 2012, spent $199 billion 
overall. See State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2011-2013 State Spending, NAT’L  
ASS’N STATE BUDGET OFFICERS 7 (2013), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/State 
%20Expenditure%20Report%20%28Fiscal%202011-2013%20Data%29.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/8KHM-DDU5] [hereinafter NASBO 2011-2013]. 
46. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
48. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
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the particular enforcement challenges of federal grants, this Article lays the 
groundwork for future work in this area.49 
My argument proceeds in three parts. After describing the scope of federal 
grants in the contemporary regulatory state, Part I disaggregates the intergov-
ernmental grant system, especially the distinct features of different types of 
federal grants, grant conditions, and rationales for grantee noncompliance, as 
well as the types of informal and formal mechanisms available to agencies to 
enforce grant conditions. In this Part, as in the rest of the Article, many of the 
examples used to illustrate particular points are drawn from grants overseen by 
the agencies that administer grants as a core element of their operations—the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education. 
I use these examples to make the broader point that we have much to learn 
about administrative practice from these understudied agencies. 
Part II debunks the classic critiques of the funding cut-off as a formal en-
forcement tool, demonstrating that all four of the critiques vastly oversimplify 
the interests of grant beneficiaries, the role of federalism, agency capacity and 
motivation, and intergovernmental and interbranch political dynamics. I argue 
that even if these critiques accurately explain why agencies have traditionally 
been reluctant to withhold funds, these explanations are difficult to defend writ 
large and need to be challenged to account for the variety of types of grants, 
grant conditions, and rationales for noncompliance, among other things. 
Part III begins by developing a framework for assessing when funding cut-
offs can be most useful—namely, when they can encourage change within the 
noncompliant state and signal to other states that the agency is serious about 
enforcement, increasing other states’ compliance. This Part concludes by as-
sessing the implications of this framework for administrative regime design 
and judicial review. In particular, I argue that the Office of Management and 
Budget ought to include procedures in its ongoing reform of the federal grants 
process to permit the public to call agencies’ attention to grantee noncompli-
ance more effectively. In addition, agencies ought to consider ways to divide 
their grant-making and grant enforcement personnel differently; Congress 
 
49. In future work, for example, I will address the administrative practice that has developed 
around the Administrative Procedure Act’s exemption of grants from notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012); contrast the strikingly different role that the 
White House’s Office of Management and Budget has played with respect to centralized re-
view of grant-making with the role that the White House’s Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs (OIRA) has played with respect to centralized review of rulemaking; contrast 
the regulatory effects of systematic reauthorizations of most grant-making statutes with the 
regulatory effects of statutory regimes that are expected to exist more or less in perpetuity; 
and consider the extent to which administrative practice ought to treat grants to state and 
local governments differently from grants to non-profit organizations, for-profit organiza-
tions, and individuals. 
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ought to consider rationalizing directions for funding cut-offs across different 
statutory regimes; and courts ought to resist any effort to impose a special fed-
eralism version of hard-look review on agencies’ funding cut-off decisions. 
My defense of the funding cut-off is not meant to suggest that it is appro-
priate for all violations of grant conditions, or even all serious violations of 
grant conditions. Instead, I want to call attention to the potential positives of 
the mechanism so that trade-offs can be evaluated on the merits of each case 
within the framework I offer, rather than with a thumb on the scale in opposi-
tion to the mechanism itself. Game theory suggests that heavy-duty enforce-
ment options can have an effect even when they are not used, because their ex-
istence induces compliance.50 But so-called nuclear options are unlikely to have 
this effect when everyone knows that agencies are gun-shy.51 Only serious will-
ingness to use the mechanism, and a move away from rhetoric about its prob-
lems and overall agency fecklessness, can make the game theory argument 
work. Ironically, then, an increased willingness to use the mechanism could 
lead to more compliance without significant loss of federal funds. 
i .  disaggregating the intergovernmental grant system 
This Part describes the scope of federal grant-making from the perspective 
of both the federal government and state and local grantees; explains the varie-
ty of types of grants, grant conditions, and reasons for grantee noncompliance; 
and presents the process by which federal agencies oversee the grants they con-
trol. While the paucity of attention to the details of federal grants in the legal 
literature makes this Part useful as a purely descriptive matter, this Part also 
illustrates a larger point: because grants, grant conditions, and rationales for 
noncompliance are so varied, a discussion of the merits and demerits of fund-
ing cut-offs that treats grants as a monolith will miss important nuances. 
A. The Scope of Grant-Making in the Federal Regulatory State 
Federal agencies provide vast amounts of funding in grants each year. In 
2013, agencies channeled over $540 billion in grants to state and local govern-
 
50. See, e.g., Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Big-
gest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442 (2012). 
51. See KEY, supra note 14, at 177 (“When conditions appearing to warrant discontinuance of 
grants are tolerated, the implied threat of withdrawal ceases to have potency.”). 
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ments, totaling approximately 15.8% of the federal budget52 and representing 
about 80% of all federal grants.53 
This dedication of federal funds to grant programs is a relatively new story 
in the regulatory state.54 In 1960, for example, federal grants to state and local 
governments represented 7.6% of all federal outlays and 1.3% of GDP, while by 
2013, these percentages had more than doubled.55 A great deal of this increase is 
attributable to Medicaid, the federal grant program passed in 1965 to assist 
states in providing healthcare to low-income Americans.56 Medicaid currently 
represents the largest grant program by far, constituting 45% of federal grant 
outlays to state and local governments in 2011.57 As a share of all federal out-
lays, Medicaid grants to state and local governments have tripled since 1980.58 
But even setting Medicaid aside, hundreds of billions of dollars flow each year 
from federal agencies to state and local governments in a wide variety of policy 
areas.59 
Federal grants to state and local governments expanded dramatically in ab-
solute dollar amounts as a result of the stimulus spending in 2009 and 2010, by 
one estimate adding $264 billion on top of the usual annual funding through 
2013.60 Nonetheless, the proportion of total federal outlays devoted to state and 
local grants has remained fairly steady over the last three decades,61 notwith-
 
52. See OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 245 tbl.15-1. 
53. GAO, supra note 2, at 7. 
54. For a discussion of the rise of federal grants from the early nineteenth century through their 
expansion in the New Deal in the 1930s and the Great Society in the 1960s, see, for example, 
CAPPALLI, supra note 12, §§ 1:19-25 (1988); DONALD F. KETTL, GOVERNMENT BY PROXY: 
(MIS?)MANAGING FEDERAL PROGRAMS 50-54 (1988); KEY, supra note 14, at 1-26; and Bruce 
J. Casino, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Evolution, Crisis, and Future, 20 URB. LAW. 25, 29-30 (1988). 
55. See OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 245 tbl.15-1; see also CONG. BUDG-
ET OFFICE, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2-7 (2013) [hereinafter 
CBO] (describing growth in federal grants since the mid-twentieth century). By compari-
son, national defense outlays in 2011 (when federal grants to state and local governments 
constituted 4.1% of GDP) represented 4.7% of GDP. GAO, supra note 2, at 7. 
56. See generally FRANK J. THOMPSON, MEDICAID POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POLICY DURABILITY, 
AND HEALTH REFORM (2012) (describing the rise and evolution of Medicaid during recent 
presidential administrations). 
57. GAO, supra note 2, at 7. 
58. Id. at 9-10. 
59. Id.; see also OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 246-53 (describing the 
wide array of grant programs in aid to state and local governments).  
60. CBO, supra note 55, at 3; see also NASBO 2011-2013, supra note 45, at 1-2 (discussing the ef-
fect of stimulus spending on state budgets). 
61. GAO, supra note 2, at 9. 
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standing the (ultimately temporary) declines during the Reagan Administra-
tion.62 
Depending on political perspective, these amounts are either too high (a se-
ries of coercive and wasteful government boondoggles) or too low (a shameful 
failure to support infrastructure, safety, civic goods like education and 
healthcare, and the needy). But no matter the perspective, one thing is clear: to 
understand the federal regulatory state, it is critical to understand federal 
grant-making. 
Grant-making is important to understand not only because it is a signifi-
cant function that agencies perform, but also because it drives a good deal of 
the relationship between the federal government and state and local authori-
ties. From the federal perspective, fourteen of the fifteen cabinet-level depart-
ments give grants to state and local governments.63 For some cabinet depart-
ments, giving such grants is their bread and butter. The Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), for example, is the leading grant-making agency, 
with its largest 2013 intergovernmental grants overseen by two sub-agencies, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (including $286.9 billion in 
Medicaid grants and $8.9 billion in grants under the Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program) and the Administration for Children and Families (including 
$16.7 billion in grants through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, $7.6 
billion for Head Start, and over $5 billion for child care assistance).64 The De-
partment of Education (ED) is another agency whose existence is predicated on 
grant-making. Its largest intergovernmental grants in 2013 came from the Of-
fice of Elementary and Secondary Education ($13.7 billion in Title I grants un-
der No Child Left Behind and $2.3 billion in grants to improve teacher quality) 
and the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services ($10.9 billion 
for special education and $3 billion for vocational rehabilitation).65 ED is a 
 
62. OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 245 tbl.15-1; see also TIMOTHY CON-
LAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL REFORM 141-69 (1998) (describing cuts in federal grants to state and local governments 
under President Reagan). 
63. See supra note 5. 
64. See OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 253 tbl.15-3. Other operating divi-
sions in HHS oversee grants as well. See HHS Grants Policy Statement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., at I-1 to -3 (2007), http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ogapa/aboutog/hhsgps107.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SBE2-GG8B]. In the case of some of these operating divisions, such as the 
Food and Drug Administration, grant-giving plays a subordinate role to regulation, see 
What Does FDA Do?, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency 
/Basics/ucm194877.htm[http://perma.cc/5VJP-EWQJ], while other operating divisions fo-
cus almost exclusively on grant-giving, see Budget, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/about /budget [http://perma.cc/9ACQ-KDSR]. 
65. See OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 253 tbl.15-3.  
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grants-driven agency, with little regulatory work done outside of providing 
federal funds.66 
Some other cabinet-level departments give significant amounts of funding 
to subnational governments through grants each year, while still playing larger 
regulatory roles beyond grant-making. The Departments of Agriculture, Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Labor, and Transportation fall into this catego-
ry.67 For example, in Fiscal Year 2013, the Department of Transportation pro-
vided $40 billion in highway grants, $9 billion in transit grants, and $3 billion 
in airport improvement grants,68 while largely focusing its work on other areas 
(such as promoting transportation-related safety through regulation and com-
pliance reviews).69 
The remaining cabinet-level departments give smaller but hardly negligible 
sums of money through grants, whether regularly or on a short-term basis, and 
all but the State Department fund (or have recently funded) state and local 
governments through grants.70 
 
66. See U.S. DEP’T EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/summary/14summary.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ASR5-HAHS] (describing the agency’s work). 
67. See OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 253 tbl.15-3. 
68. Id. 
69. See U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (June  
18, 2013), http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/FY2014_annual_performance_plan 
_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/7MSL-VHTR] (identifying five strategic goals, each with multiple 
initiatives, and identifying grant-making as only one of a variety of mechanisms to achieve 
the desired outcome for only a subset of the initiatives). 
70. See supra note 5. For example, the Department of Homeland Security regularly funds state 
and local governments with preparedness/non-disaster grants from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). See Preparedness (Non-Disaster) Grants, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. ASS’N, http://www.fema.gov/preparedness-non-disaster-grants [http://perma.cc 
/PP76-82DF]. The Department of Justice regularly provides intergovernmental grants for 
law enforcement. See State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S.  
DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2014summary/pdf/fy14-state-local.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/EW84-7MCD]. The Department of Commerce regularly provides funding to 
states and localities to implement broadband through the National Telecommunications  
& Information Administration’s State and Local Implementation Grant  
Program. See Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Grants, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/grants [http://perma.cc/9FJZ-R56F]. The Department 
of Energy regularly provides grants through its State Energy Program, see Office of Energy 
Efficiency & Renewable Energy, State Energy Program Competitive Financial Assistance Pro-
gram, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http:// energy.gov/eere/wipo/state-energy-program-competitive-
financial-assistance-program [http://perma.cc/U5PQ-7NLH], while the stimulus bill pro-
vided several billion dollars through the Energy Efficiency and Conservation grant program, 
see Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block 
Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://energy.gov/eere/wipo/energy-efficiency-and 
-conservation-block-grant-program [http://perma.cc/H2Q-QVAN]. The Department of the 
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Beyond the cabinet-level departments, other federal agencies give intergov-
ernmental grants as well. Most notably, the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Office of Water provided around $2.3 billion in intergovernmental grants in 
2013,71 although the Agency as a whole conducted the bulk of its work through 
other regulatory mechanisms.72 Some other non-cabinet agencies, including 
the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration, and the National Endowment for the Arts, also provide a kind of in-
tergovernmental grant in the form of research grants to state universities.73 
The last significant executive branch player in the domain of federal grants 
is the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has 
long provided detailed interagency guidance on basic principles related to grant 
administration.74 This coordinating role has recently received increased atten-
 
Treasury provided grants to states for low-income housing projects under a temporary pro-
gram created by the stimulus bill. See Office of the Fiscal Assistant Sec’y, Application and 
Terms and Conditions: Grants to States for Low-Income Housing Projects in Lieu of Low-Income 
Housing Credits for 2009, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives 
/Documents/LIH_application-package.pdf [http://perma.cc /MJ7G-4UKV]. The Depart-
ment of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment regularly provides grants to state and lo-
cal governments to support either a large or a declining Defense presence. See Office of 
Econ. Adjustment, Grants, U.S. DEP’T DEF., http://www.oea.gov/grants/information 
/assistance [http://perma.cc/EA9A-95Q2]. The Department of the Interior regularly pro-
vides intergovernmental grants through a variety of sub-agencies, including the Bureau of 
Land Management, the Office of Surface Mining, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the Office of Insular Affairs. See Grants  
and Payments, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2014 
/highlights/upload/L001.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8AE-TD2M]. The Department of Veterans 
Affairs regularly provides grants to states to build and support extended care  
facilities. See FY 2015 President’s Budget Request, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS  
10, http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/Fy2015-BudgetRollout.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/G472-KP6N].  
71. OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 253 tbl.15-3.  
72. Fiscal Year 2014-2018 EPA Strategic Plan, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2014), http://www2 
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/epa_strategic_plan_fy14-18.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/S23W-W8GB] (identifying five strategic goals, each with multiple objectives, and 
mentioning grant-making only occasionally as a strategy the agency will pursue to achieve 
the desired objectives).  
73. See Prime Award Spending Data 2013, supra note 5. 
74. See, e.g., Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements 
for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,590, 78,590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 2 C.F.R. 
ch.1, and ch.2 pts. 200, 215, 220, 225, and 230) (“provid[ing] a governmentwide framework 
for grants management” by “superced[ing] and streamlin[ing] requirements from [eight 
different] OMB Circulars”) [hereinafter 2013 Uniform Administrative Requirements]; Uni-
form Administrative Requirements for Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments, 42 
Fed. Reg. 45,828, 45,828 (Aug. 24, 1977) (“promulgat[ing] standards for establishing con-
sistency and uniformity among Federal agencies in the administration of grants to State, lo-
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tion from both Congress and the President. In 2006, for example, Congress 
passed (across party lines) the Federal Funding Accountability and Transpar-
ency Act, which required OMB to ensure granular transparency of federal 
funding awards by—for the first time—making all such awards publically 
available in one location.75 When President Obama (who had been a co-
sponsor of that Act as a Senator76) took office, he further directed OMB to de-
velop reforms to the federal grants process.77 Such reforms are currently under 
way, not only through OMB’s work,78 but also through the efforts of the 
Council on Financial Assistance Reform, a recently created interagency work-
ing group.79 
Just as federal grants play a large role in the work of federal agencies, they 
are also significant in state government. Federal funds combined across many 
hundreds of grant programs constituted 34.8% of total state expenditures in 
201080 (of which, as the Supreme Court noted in NFIB, Medicaid funding con-
 
cal, and federally recognized Indian tribal governments”); see also ALLEN, supra note 38, at 
46-50 (describing the rise of OMB as the “lead staff” for federal grant practice). 
75. Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 1186, 1187 (2006). The very useful website that result-
ed, http://www.usaspending.gov, provided the source material for some of my calculations 
on agency grants in this Article (although, as described infra note 386, the underlying data 
for the website is undergoing a process of review and improvement). The bill’s forty-seven 
cosponsors in the Senate included twenty-nine Republicans and eighteen Democrats. See S. 
2590 (109th): Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006,  
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2590#overview [http://perma 
.cc/X9UV-8MAN]. It passed without controversy in both houses of Congress. See 152 
CONG. REC. S9209-12 (2006); 152 CONG. REC. H6498-501 (2006). This Act was recently 
amended by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-
101,128 Stat. 1146 (2014), which transferred responsibility for the maintenance of the website 
to the Department of the Treasury, see 128 Stat. 1147, while retaining an oversight and 
standard-setting role for OMB, see 128 Stat. 1148-51. Just as its predecessor did, the Digital 
Accountability and Transparency Act received bipartisan support and passed without con-
troversy. See 160 Cong. Rec. S2359-61 (2014); 160 Cong. Rec. H3203-05 (2014). 
76. S. 2590 (109th): Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, supra note 75. 
77. Exec. Order No. 13,520, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,201 (Nov. 20, 2009); Presidential  
Memorandum—Administrative Flexibility, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE PRESS SEC’Y (Feb. 28,  
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/28/presidential-memorandum 
-administrative-flexibility [http://perma.cc/CU43-67PE]. 
78. 2013 Uniform Administrative Requirements, supra note 74. 
79. Reform of Federal Policies Relating to Grants and Cooperative Agreements; Cost Principles 
and Administrative Requirements (Including Single Audit Act), 78 Fed. Reg. 7282, 7284 
(Feb. 1, 2013) (describing the Council on Financial Assistance Reform’s creation and re-
placement of two previous federal boards focusing on federal grant policy); see also COUNCIL 
ON FIN. ASSISTANCE REFORM, https://cfo.gov/cofar [http://perma.cc/HGG6-SWWZ] (de-
scribing the Council’s mission). 
80. State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2010-2012 State Spending, NAT’L ASS’N STATE 
BUDGET OFFICERS 2 (2012) [hereinafter NASBO 2010-2012], http://www.nasbo.org/sites 
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stituted the largest share),81 down to 31.4% of total state expenditures by 
2012.82 To be sure, this high percentage reflects both the temporary influx of 
grants from the stimulus spending and the state budget cuts that instigated the 
stimulus in the first place.83 But federal funds still accounted for over a quarter 
of total state expenditures even before the economic crisis.84 
It is difficult to calculate exact percentages for how much federal grant 
money goes to local governments as opposed to state governments, as a good 
deal of funding to states is passed on to localities, on top of separate grants 
made directly to local governments or related entities.85 Whatever the exact 
figure, however, it is clear that localities receive a substantial amount of fund-
ing from federal grants.86 
Given the size and scope of grant-making in today’s regulatory state, then, 
federal grants play an important role in mediating the relationships between 
federal agencies and state and local governments. 
B. Types of Grants, Grant Conditions, and Grantee Noncompliance 
To understand the nuanced role of federal grants, it is important to tease 
apart the different ways federal grants are structured, for different types of 
grants give rise to different types of agency-grantee relationships. It is also im-
portant to understand the different types of grant conditions that may appear 
in federal grants, since these affect the ease of compliance and of tracking com-
pliance, and therefore the agency-grantee relationship. Finally, it is important 
to understand the different rationales for grantee noncompliance, for these, 




81. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion). 
82. NASBO 2011-2013, supra note 45, at 2. 
83. NASBO 2010-2012, supra note 80, at 2. 
84. Id. 
85. In 2011, just over 4% of local government revenues came directly from federal sources. See 
JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FI-
NANCES SUMMARY: 2011, at 6 (2013). But close to 30% of local government revenues came 
from state sources, and much of this state funding itself came from federal grants. Id. at 1; 
see also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of 
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 973 (2007) (describing local reliance on federal fund-
ing). 
86. See generally PIETRO S. NIVOLA, TENSE COMMANDMENTS: FEDERAL PRESCRIPTIONS AND CITY 
PROBLEMS (2002) (criticizing the significant role that federal grants play in governing local 
governments’ policy choices). 
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sions—the different types of grants, grant conditions, and rationales for grant-
ee noncompliance—demonstrates the need for specificity when discussing 
funding cut-offs. 
1. Types of Grants 
The first dimension along which a grant can be described relates to the way 
the grant is funded from year to year. Mandatory programs stem from author-
izing legislation that directly provides funding either indefinitely or for a speci-
fied multi-year period.87 These programs are thus funded outside the control of 
the normal annual appropriations process; no further action by Congress is re-
quired for the funds to become available.88 In contrast, discretionary programs 
stem from authorizing legislation that provides no funding directly but re-
quires Congress to allocate funds through the appropriations process each year 
to continue the program.89 The appropriations process allocates funds for each 
program within the amount authorized by each program’s governing statute.90 
While the largest grant (Medicaid) and some of the best known (Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, colloquially known as welfare, and 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, colloquially known 
as food stamps) are mandatory, discretionary programs are the norm.91 
A second dimension along which grants can be described relates to who 
may apply. As indicated above, the bulk of federal grant money goes directly to 
states,92 typically (but not always) to the state agency equivalent to the federal 
agency awarding the grant.93 But local government entities may apply directly 
 
87. D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33074, MANDATORY 
SPENDING SINCE 1962, at 1 (2012); CBO, supra note 55, at 15-16; Tim Westmoreland, Stand-
ard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1564-65 (2007). 
88. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 87, at 2. 
89. Id.; CBO, supra note 55, at 15-16. 
90. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 191-94 (3d ed. 2007). 
91. AUSTIN & LEVIT, supra note 87, at 1; CBO, supra note 55, at 15-16. 
92. See OMB, FY14 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 301 tbl.17-2 (showing $544.6 bil-
lion in FY12 federal grants to state and local governments); NAT’L ASS’N STATE BUDGETING 
OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FISCAL 2011-2013 STATE SPENDING 7 
tbl.1 (2013) (showing that, for FY12, state governments expended over $516 billion in federal 
funds). 
93. See, e.g., Guide to U.S. Department of Education Programs: Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. 12, 19 [hereinafter Guide to Education Programs], http://www2.ed.gov/programs/gtep 
/gtep.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZU3G-TAST] (describing applications from state educational 
agencies); id. at 10, 11 (describing applications from state governors’ offices); id. at 8 (de-
scribing applications from a consortium of states). 
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for some grants,94 and even federal grant money that flows to states often 
makes its way to local government entities in the form of sub-grants made by 
the state.95 
A third dimension along which grants can be categorized describes the ex-
tent to which the grant is competitive. If the grant is available to all states that 
agree to meet the program’s conditions, it is a formula grant, under which 
funding is made available under a congressionally determined set of directions 
that typically takes into account state population, among other factors.96 For-
mula grants are different from competitive grants, also called project grants,97 
which require states, localities, or other entities to compete for funding for a 
particular project.98 Two well-known project grants of recent years are the Ed-
ucation Department’s Race to the Top99 and the Department of Transporta-
 
94. See, e.g., id. at 9, 14, 15 (describing applications from local educational agencies). 
95. Id. For a specific example, see 20 U.S.C. § 1411(f) (2012), an IDEA provision that discusses 
sub-grants to localities, and id. § 1413, an IDEA provision that imposes requirements on lo-
cal sub-grantees. Other grants may invite applications from non-profit organizations, occa-
sionally from for-profit organizations, and even more occasionally from individuals. See 
DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 37; Who Is Eligible to Submit to a Funding  
Opportunity?, GRANTS.GOV, http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/applicants/grant-eligibility 
.html [http://perma.cc/9894-WWCK]. I focus here, however, on states and localities as the 
dominant set of grant recipients and the ones for whom compliance and enforcement are 
most contested, reserving consideration of the rest of the universe of federal grants for fu-
ture work. See supra note 49. 
96. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 11; MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL 
GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 6 (1970); CBO, supra note 55, at 14-15; 
GAO, supra note 2, at 4. 
97. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 11; DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 6; CBO, supra note 
55, at 15; GAO, supra note 2, at 4. Sometimes “competitive” and “project” grants are also 
called “discretionary” grants, to indicate that the agency has discretion in whether to award 
funds to an applicant, as opposed to the formula grants that the agency also awards. See, 
e.g., DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 11 (distinguishing between “formula grants” and 
“competitive/discretionary grants”); Guide to Education Programs, supra note 93, at xix 
(same). To avoid confusion with the distinction between mandatory and discretionary 
spending from an appropriations perspective, which focuses instead on the extent to which 
Congress has discretion in allocating funds, I will use the term “competitive” or “project” 
grants rather than “discretionary” grants where it is the agency’s discretion, rather than 
Congress’s, that is at issue. 
98. CBO, supra note 55, at 14-15. In addition to formula grants and project grants, a third type of 
funding to the states is general revenue sharing, which provides funding to state and local 
governments with essentially no strings attached. See CONLAN, supra note 62, at 3. Such a 
program existed briefly during the 1970s, but the Reagan administration wound it down. Id. 
at 4. 
99. See Race to the Top Fund, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop 
/index.html [http://perma.cc/LF38-SQZR]. 
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tion’s Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) 
grants,100 both developed as part of the stimulus spending of 2009. 
Formula grants may be further distinguished according to the specificity of 
their requirements. Categorical grants impose more detailed requirements on 
recipients, while block grants provide only general directions relating to the 
subject matter for which they should be used.101 Categorical grants include the 
highly regulated Medicaid102 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA),103 for example, while block grants include the much more open-
ended Child Care and Development Block Grant.104 
Another dimension along which a grant can be described relates to the 
grant’s expected duration. Some grants are one-time offerings for a limited pe-
riod with no expectation of renewal.105 Other grants are expected to continue 
indefinitely, whether because they are mandatory106 or because, while discre-
tionary, they become politically or operationally entrenched.107 It is more typi-
cally the case that project grants are of limited duration, while formula grants 
are expected to continue indefinitely,108 but that alignment is not necessary. 
For example, the stimulus spending included several one-time formula 
grants,109 while Head Start is a project grant that has typically involved ongo-
ing funding.110 
 
100. See TIGER Discretionary Grants, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/tiger [http:// 
perma.cc/V36Y-RZJK]. 
101. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 11-12; GAO, supra note 2, at 3; Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested 
Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 302-03 (1996). While these types of grants are often 
taken as opposites, in practice, they may better be thought of as taking place along a spec-
trum. See GAO, supra note 2, at 3; Mashaw & Calsyn, supra, at 300-03. 
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012) (setting forth requirements for state plans); id. § 1396b (defin-
ing formulas for state grantees). 
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012) (defining formulas for state grantees); id. § 1412 (setting forth 
requirements for state grantees). 
104. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858m (2012) (defining formulas for state grantees); id. § 9858c (setting 
forth requirements for state plans). 
105. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 38. 
106. See id. 
107. See Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 906-07 (discussing the concept of entrenchment with re-
spect to Medicaid and federal education programs). 
108. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 243 (identifying as one difference between project grants and 
formula grants that the former “are funded[] for fixed or known periods”). 
109. See State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 7, 2009), http://www2.ed.gov 
/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/stabilization-fund.html [http://perma.cc/MDF8-TKDJ]. 
110. See Ohio Head Start Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 873 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
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Grants also vary with respect to whether their funding is prospective or ret-
rospective. Most grants are prospective—that is, they are awarded in contem-
plation of future (or continuing) implementation.111 Some grants, however, are 
retrospective, awarded as reimbursement for spending the states have already 
done.112 Medicaid is the classic example of reimbursement grant funding,113 but 
there are others.114  
Another way in which grants vary is with respect to the predictability of 
their cost. Some grants are open-ended entitlements that provide funding 
without an upper limit as long as certain statutory requirements are met. Medi-
caid is the best known of such grants, but other smaller grants fall into this cat-
egory as well.115 All open-ended grants are those that fall into the category of 
mandatory grants.116 In contrast, most grants contain a specified upper limit of 
available funds. These capped grants may be either mandatory (such as the 
State Children’s Health Program or TANF) or discretionary (such as grants 
under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and the IDEA).117 
Finally, grants may be categorized according to their purpose. Some inter-
governmental grants may be characterized as compensatory, designed to assist 
states and localities in policy areas in which federal action has produced nega-
tive externalities.118 For example, Impact Aid grants to local school districts at-
tempt to compensate for the presence of federal land removed from local tax 
rolls and therefore unavailable to support local schools.119 Other grants reflect 
the federal government’s superior fiscal capacity, prompting aid for projects the 
states would be unable to undertake alone.120 Federal assistance for state ex-
pansion of unemployment benefits during recessions is one example of such a 
 
111. DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 38-39. 
112. Id. 
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(1) (2012). 
114. See, e.g., id. § 1753 (National School Lunch Program). 
115. See Vaccines for Children Program, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-66, § 13631 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); CBO, supra note 55, at 15. 
116. CBO, supra note 55, at 15. 
117. Id. at 15-16; Westmoreland, supra note 87, at 1565 n.55. 
118. Super, supra note 40, at 2571-74. David Super’s helpful typology governs the fiscal relation-
ship between the federal government and states more generally, not simply within the con-
text of grants, but also as applied to more general fiscal relationships. See also CBO, supra 
note 55, at 7-12 (discussing rationales for federal grants to states and localities). 
119. See Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, About Impact Aid, U.S. DEP’T  
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oese/impactaid/whatisia.html [http://perma 
.cc/56N8-3V8P]. 
120. Super, supra note 40, at 2574-77. 
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grant.121 Still other grants are designed along a leadership model, under which 
the federal government offers funding to promote particular national priori-
ties.122 Grants under NCLB and the IDEA, through which the federal govern-
ment seeks to change the content and delivery of educational services, are ex-
amples of this model.123 Obviously, there may be overlap between these catego-
categories, so that any given grant may have multiple purposes. 
As should be clear by now, the prospect of withholding grant funds might 
have a different texture depending on the kind of grant involved. The relation-
ship between the agency and the recipient may be quite different depending on 
whether the grant in question is a project grant with no expectation of renewal 
offered to encourage grantees to implement national priorities, a block grant 
offered with expectation of annual renewal to compensate for federal externali-
ties, a categorical grant offered under very different appropriations levels from 
year to year to help grantees survive difficult economic circumstances, and so 
on. But that is not all. The variety of grant conditions also affects the under-
standing of the role of withholding grant funds.  
2. Types of Grant Conditions 
As with the types of grants, the conditions attached to grants may also be 
categorized along different dimensions. One dimension concerns the subject 
matter of the conditions. Some conditions are administrative, placing certain 
requirements on how a program must be run: matching funds, overhead, fiscal 
controls, disclosure obligations, and the like.124 Some conditions are program-
matic, focusing on the substantive requirements of the particular grant: which 
population should be served, what the service must consist of, how the service 
should be coordinated, and so on.125 Some conditions are cross-cutting, in that 
they apply across a wide variety of grant programs.126 Non-discrimination re-
quirements are the best example of this type of condition, but there are oth-
 
121. Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-449, 122 Stat. 5014; 
Super, supra note 40, at 2576. 
122. Super, supra note 40, at 2577-79. 
123. See generally Arun K. Ramanathan, Paved with Good Intentions: The Federal Role in the Over-
sight and Enforcement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB), 110 TCHRS. C. REC. 278 (2008) (describing the goals of these grant 
programs). 
124. CBO, supra note 55, at 10-11, 16-18 (describing certain kinds of administrative conditions).  
125. Id. at 13-14 (providing examples of programmatic conditions). 
126. See DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 107-13; HHS Grants Policy Statement, supra note 
64, at II-2 to II-6 (providing an overview of cross-cutting requirements applicable to HHS 
grants).  
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ers.127 Finally, some conditions are cross-overs, in that they place conditions on 
one program based on funding given in another.128 The Clean Air Act, which 
depends on federal highway funding rather than on its own funding stream, is 
the classic example of this type of condition.129 
Grant conditions may also vary in their level of specificity in terms of what 
is required. Some conditions are very general. For example, the IDEA provides 
that children with disabilities must receive a “free appropriate public educa-
tion,” but does not define what that means.130 Other conditions are much more 
specific.131 For example, the IDEA places very detailed requirements on certain 
procedures that schools must take when meeting with parents.132 Between the-
se extremes, grant conditions vary greatly in their specificity. 
Grant conditions also vary with respect to the actor on whom the burden of 
satisfying the requirement is placed. Some place requirements on government 
administrators of the grant—for example, by mandating that the administrator 
take particular oversight actions with respect to sub-grantees or beneficiaries.133 
Other conditions may place requirements on service providers paid for with 
grant funds—for example, by limiting the type of activity the provider might 
take.134 Other conditions may place requirements on grant beneficiaries—for 
example, by mandating that a beneficiary accomplish some task before being 
eligible (or retaining eligibility for) services under the grant.135 
Grant conditions may also vary with respect to the kind of accomplish-
ments that are required. Conditions may place requirements on inputs, out-
puts, or outcomes. An input requirement might specify, for example, that a 
 
127. Cross-cutting conditions themselves may be some combination of administrative and pro-
grammatic. For example, a non-discrimination requirement may affect bureaucratic man-
agement of a grant in, say, race-neutral school assignment policies, but it may also affect 
substantive programmatic delivery of a grant in, say, a school’s range of sports teams to sat-
isfy Title IX. 
128. See KETTL, supra note 54, at 53. 
129. See Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 916-17. 
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012); see also Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187-90 (1982) (in-
terpreting this requirement). 
131. See DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 133-34 (describing the length and specificity of the federal 
government’s directive to the states as part of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1962). 
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)-(d) (2012). 
133. See, e.g., id. § 6316(b)(14) (imposing obligations on a state educational agency overseeing 
local educational agencies under No Child Left Behind). 
134. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 154-55 (discussing limitations on caseworkers under 
the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children program). 
135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2012) (imposing work requirements on prospective and current 
recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). 
  
agency enforcement of spending clause statutes 
273 
 
meeting between the parents of a child with a disability and the child’s teachers 
must take place within a certain time.136 An output requirement might specify, 
for example, that a particular bridge will be built or replaced.137 And an out-
come requirement might specify, for example, that all children will reach profi-
ciency on state academic tests by a certain date.138 
Withholding funds to induce compliance with grant conditions has a dif-
ferent valence depending on the type of condition at stake. Specific, input-
oriented administrative conditions placed on the government administrator are 
very different from general, outcome-oriented programmatic conditions placed 
on program beneficiaries, after all. But once more, that is not all. The reason 
for grantee noncompliance also affects the analysis. 
3. Types of Grantee Noncompliance 
Just as grants and grant conditions are not monolithic, neither are types of 
grantee noncompliance. Grantee noncompliance may be usefully divided into 
six broad categories. 
First, noncompliance may be of the bumbling administrator variety. For 
example, through poor recordkeeping, disorganization, or misunderstanding 
of the grant’s terms, the grantee may misspend grant funds, perhaps by direct-
ing funds to ineligible recipients,139 overspending on eligible recipients,140 us-
ing funds for purposes not covered by the grant,141 or spending funds outside 
 
136. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012) (specifying certain evaluation and meeting requirements 
for children with or suspected of having disabilities). 
137. See CBO, supra note 55, at 13 (describing Transportation Investment Generating Economic 
Recovery grants). 
138. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2012). 
139. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253 (1986) (grantee spent funds to retrain ineligible 
workers); Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 821 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(grantee used federal grants for bilingual education on students who were not bilingual); 
Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Sec’y of Educ., 806 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1986) (grantee spent federal 
funds earmarked for education of at-risk students instead for general education purposes). 
140. See, e.g., Mount Sinai Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 
1975) (grantee overbilled Medicare for unnecessary procedures and care); Lummi Tribe of 
the Lummi Reservation v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 584 (2011) (grantee improperly count-
ed certain homes in calculating housing benefits from a federal grant). 
141. See, e.g., New York v. Riley, 53 F.3d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (grantee spent grant 
funds improperly on salary and expenses); Ledbetter v. Shalala, 986 F.2d 428, 430 (11th Cir. 
1993) (grantee spent more than the allowable amount of grant money on administration); 
Cal. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett, 849 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (grantee improperly directed 
grant funds toward conferences, transportation, and student field trips). 
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of the designated time for the grant.142 Poor recordkeeping itself can constitute 
such noncompliance.143 
Second, more perniciously, noncompliance may be of the conniving admin-
istrator variety. For example, grant administrators may intentionally engage in 
corrupt activities such as fraud or embezzlement.144 They may intentionally 
violate grant conditions prohibiting conduct such as nepotism145 or engaging in 
partisan political activities146 with the purpose of benefitting themselves or 
their families. 
Third, noncompliance may result from intentional actions that the grantee 
undertakes out of a genuine disagreement about what constitutes compliance. 
For example, the grantee may take issue with the agency’s interpretation of 
what a condition requires.147 The grantee may agree with the agency’s statutory 
interpretation but disagree with its determination of the facts.148 Or the grantee 
may contest the agency’s jurisdiction over the grantee actions at issue.149 
Fourth, noncompliance may be a result of intentional actions that the 
grantee undertakes in protest of the policy set forth in the federal grant or con-
 
142. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (grantee did not spend its grants in a timely fashion); City of New York v. Shalala, 34 
F.3d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Illinois, 144 F. Supp. 2d 990 (C.D. 
Ill. 2001) (grantee spent leftover grant funding after the allowable grant period); Appeal of 
the State of California, 54 EDUC. LAW. REP. 1450 (1987), 1987 WL 124136. 
143. See, e.g., City of Newark v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 2 F.3d 31 (3d Cir. 1993) (grantee failed to 
properly document how it used federal grant funds); Cal. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett, 843 
F.2d 333, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (same); Application of N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Educ., No. 90-70-R (E.D. O.H.A. 1994), 1994 WL 907419 (same); Application of the State 
of Washington, No. 89-6-R (E.D. O.H.A. 1989), http://oha.ed.gov/cases/1989-6-r.html 
[http://perma.cc/3BGD-YEFU] (same). 
144. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 805 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1986); Ariz. 
Dep’t of Educ., ACN 09-04-58090, No. 06-07-R (Dep’t of Educ. Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://oha.ed.gov/cases/2006-07-R.pdf [http://perma.cc/EBB5-SDZE]. 
145. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Manpower Program v. Donovan, 718 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983), disap-
proved of by Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253 (1986); California Schools Chief Surrenders in 
Funds Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03 /29/us/california 
-schools-chief-surrenders-in-funds-case.html [http://perma.cc/CM4H-SS2E]. 
146. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
147. See, e.g., Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curi-
am) (grantee disagreed with agency’s interpretation of statutory term); Ariz. Dep’t of Li-
brary, Archives, and Pub. Records, 1995 WL 934882 (E.D. O.H.A. 1995) (same). 
148. See, e.g., S.C. Dep’t of Educ. v. Duncan, 714 F.3d 249, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2013) (grantee disa-
greed with agency’s determination of facts); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Ed. Law Rep. 
1396 (E.D. O.H.A. 1992) (same). 
149. See, e.g., Freeman v. Cavazos, 756 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1990) (grantee refused to cooperate 
in an agency investigation because of a belief that agency’s regulations were ultra vires). 
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dition, an expression of “uncooperative federalism.”150 For example, a grantee 
may refuse to adopt laws or change policies required as a condition of accepting 
a federal grant out of a substantive disagreement with the federal require-
ment.151 A grantee may also engage in half-hearted compliance in an effort to 
undercut (and thereby prompt change in) the law.152 
Fifth, noncompliance may result when programmatic grant conditions are 
difficult to meet and the grantee is undertaking best efforts to reach compli-
ance. For example, the grantee may have satisfied all of the input-focused con-
ditions within its control but may nonetheless fail to meet an outcome-oriented 
condition.153 Or the grantee may be making the most progress it can given ca-
pacity limitations.154 
Finally, noncompliance may result when programmatic grant conditions 
are difficult to meet but the grantee is undertaking less than satisfactory steps 
to reach compliance. For example, the grantee may have done very little after 
years of formal agency warnings or settlement agreements.155 
As this analysis suggests, commentators’ undifferentiated references to 
funding cut-offs, without discussion of the particular type of grant, grant con-
dition, and grantee noncompliance at stake, conflate a wide variety of issues. 
 
150. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1271-84. 
151. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (grantee failed to adopt the minimum 
drinking age required by acceptance of federal funds); Pac. Legal Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 
917 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the grantee failed to submit a plan for regulating air 
pollution before a deadline); Ariz. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & 
Welfare, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971) (grantee’s eligibility requirements for public assistance 
were inconsistent with federal regulations). More generally, grantees’ refusal to comply with 
school desegregation mandates in the 1960s fall into this category. See, e.g., Buford City Bd. 
of Educ., No. CR-463 (E.D. O.H.A. 1967), 1967 WL 20257; Strong Sch. Dist. No. 83, No. 
CR-303 (E.D. O.H.A. 1967), 1967 WL 20261. 
152. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1282. 
153. In 2009, for example, it became clear that every state grantee would fail to meet the re-
quirement of No Child Left Behind that 100% of students meet proficiency standards on 
state tests by 2014, even though the state grantees had otherwise followed the requirements 
of the funding program. See generally ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2 
.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [http://perma.cc/BRY6-U4UW] (de-
scribing the waiver program developed to accommodate this situation). 
154. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 2, at 27-29. 
155. See, e.g., Lynn Schnaiberg, O.C.R. Threatens Oakland with Cutoff in Federal Funding, EDUC. 
WK., Nov. 24, 1993, at 3, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1993/11/24/12oak.h13.html 
[http://perma.cc/EFJ6-8BTT] (explaining that the grantee had a seventeen-year record of 
failing to comply with requirements); Maribeth Vander Weele & Lynn Sweet, Poor Treat-
ment of Disabled Kids May Cost Schools, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994 (explaining that the 
grantee had not complied with its own recommendations after a finding of widespread non-
compliance). 
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Before analyzing the mechanism of funding cut-offs more specifically, howev-
er, one additional piece of groundwork is necessary: we must consider how 
agencies oversee the grants they administer. 
C. The Agency Role in Grant Oversight 
In this Part, I explain the life cycle of grant oversight with particular atten-
tion to three components: the grant application process, as the initial moment 
at which agencies can shape grantee action, and the grant monitoring and en-
forcement processes, as the ongoing mechanisms by which agencies can shape 
grantee action. This explanation underscores two points. First, funding cut-
offs (and threats thereof) are part of a much longer and broader sequence of 
interactions between agencies and their grantees. Second, while many of these 
interactions are informal, funding cut-offs are part of a range of agency over-
sight and enforcement mechanisms with formal legal procedures. 
1. Application 
The agency’s initial role when a grant program is authorized or reauthor-
ized is to develop the grant application process and requirements through the 
particular program office overseeing the grant. This is true even in a formula 
grant, although the application in that context tends to be called a “state 
plan.”156 Centralized OMB requirements govern some aspects of many grant 
applications;157 general agency-specific (rather than grant-specific) require-
ments govern others;158 still others may be governed by the specific grant stat-
ute at issue.159 Notice of proposed application requirements and invitation to 
comment may be published in the Federal Register.160 
After the grant award notice goes out, the relevant state or local agencies 
prepare their applications or state plans. This is obviously the case for one-time 
competitive grants, in that states and localities will not receive the grant if they 
 
156. See, e.g., State Plans, 34 C.F.R. § 80.11 (2014). 
157. See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.101(d)(1)-(3) (identifying certain grant programs that do not follow 
the otherwise generally applicable pre-award requirements); id. § 200.200-211 (presenting 
the otherwise generally applicable pre-award requirements). 
158. See DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 107. 
159. See id. 
160. See, e.g., HHS Administration for Children and Families, New Policies and Procedural Re-
quirements for Electronic Submission of State Plans, and Program and Financial Reporting 
Forms, for Mandatory Grant Programs, 78 Fed. Reg. 38,989 (June 28, 2013). 
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do not apply,161 but even ongoing formula grants that states have long received 
require state plans to be updated as reauthorizations or other legislation or 
agency rules change requirements.162 Sometimes the grant application will re-
quire state legislative action163 or encourage such action by awarding points in a 
competition,164 and sometimes the grant program is so momentous that it re-
quires the governor’s approval,165 but in the typical case, the applications large-
ly remain within the state’s bureaucratic realm. State agencies, like their federal 
counterparts, tend to have sub-units that reflect different federal grant pro-
grams, and it is these sub-units that are typically responsible for preparing the 
relevant plan or application. This organization is partly for administrative con-
venience (since personnel time must be allocated to particular programs in or-
der to ensure that those programs are funded)166 and partly to capitalize on 
substantive expertise. 
The federal agency’s program office then evaluates the state applications, 
sometimes with the help of outside experts.167 Applications may be evaluated 
against an agency-designed rubric or against the statutory requirements them-
 
161. GAO, supra note 2, at 4-5 (describing competitive grant applications). 
162. See, e.g., State Plans, 34 C.F.R. § 80.11 (2011) (describing the process for submitting state 
plans and amendments to state plans to the Department of Education); Medicaid State Plan 
Amendments, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/State-Resource-Center/Medicaid 
-State-Plan-Amendments/Medicaid-State-Plan-Amendments.html [http://perma.cc/BN8V 
-DDUY].  
163. The Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, for example, required state legislatures 
to establish a maximum speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour in order to receive future 
highway grants. See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the 
requirement against a Spending Clause challenge). 
164. The education grant competition Race to the Top, for example, considered the hospitability 
of state laws on charter schools among its selection criteria. RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EX-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 11 (Nov. 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/programs 
/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZQA-F3SP]. 
165. The decision whether to commit state funds to an expanded Medicaid program under the 
Affordable Care Act is one such example. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are 
 Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/07/15/us/governors-face-hard-choices-over-medicaid-expansion.html [http://perma 
.cc/Y368-KCSH]. 
166. See, e.g., Grant Accountability Project, Guide to Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountabil-
ity, U.S. DOMESTIC WORKING GRP. 18 (Oct. 2005), http://www.ignet.gov/randp 
/grantguide.pdf [http://perma.cc/5AJ5-4WDM] (describing time-keeping requirements for 
selected federal agencies’ grantees). 
167. See, e.g., Arlen S. Fox, A Guide to the Federal Grants Process, NONPROFIT COORDINATING 
COMM. 6-7 (1997), http://www.npccny.org/info/5001.pdf [http://perma.cc/3VW7-B8WL] 
(describing agency process for evaluation of grant applications). 
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selves.168 With state plans in formula programs, the federal agency may ask for 
revisions before approval.169 Once a plan or application is approved, regular 
disbursements begin.170 
After an approved application is in place, grantees may return to the agency 
to request modifications to the state plan even in the absence of federal law re-
quiring such a change, perhaps to respond to shifting factual circumstances, to 
respond to alterations in state law or politics, or for some other reason.171 
Grantees may also return to the agency to request a waiver from a statutory re-
quirement, to the extent the grant statute allows for such a possibility, and un-
der the circumstances the grant statute’s waiver provision permits.172 
No matter the form in which the grantee’s obligations are set forth—
whether an originally approved application, a modification to a state plan, or a 
waiver from an aspect of the federal regime—the federal agency then turns to 
the monitoring and oversight process to ensure that grantees implement the 
program acceptably. 
2. Monitoring and Oversight 
Agencies have several mechanisms by which they monitor implementation 
of their grant programs. One occurs through the program offices that are re-
sponsible for each grant.173 The program offices typically have staff devoted not 
only to providing technical assistance but also to conducting site visits, review-
ing grantee reports on the progress of grant implementation, and asking for 
changes.174 These staff members tend to monitor grantees on a regular sched-
ule, with extra periods of review for grantees as to whom a red flag has been 
 
168. Id. 
169. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(e)(1)(E)(i) (2012).  
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3335 (2012) (requiring agencies to provide for the timely disbursal of federal 
funds); DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 93; 2 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES 
OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 10-76 to 10-89 (3d ed. 2004); SCHICK, supra note 90, at 
276-79. 
171. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 80.11(d)(2) (2014); Medicaid State Plan Amendments, supra note 162. 
172. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2012) (creating a waiver provision under No Child Left Behind); 
42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012) (creating a waiver provision under the Affordable Care Act). For a 
discussion of the rise and import of waiver provisions, see David J. Barron & Todd D. 
Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013).  
173. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., HANDBOOK FOR THE DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROCESS 6, 88-100 
(2009) [hereinafter ED GRANTS HANDBOOK]; HHS Grants Policy Statement, supra note 64, at 
I-1 to -3, I-5 to -6. 
174. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 173, at 88-100; HHS Grants Policy Statement, supra 
note 64, at I-5 to -6. 
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raised in a previous site visit, upon a review of data, or after a private party’s 
complaint.175 
A second oversight mechanism lies in agencies’ Inspector General (IG) of-
fices.176 These offices are tasked with preventing fraud and waste within agen-
cies’ programs (as well as in the federal administration of those programs).177 
IG offices may investigate allegations of misconduct, including fraud, but may 
also investigate substantive program implementation.178 These investigations 
may be triggered by a complaint from a program beneficiary, a grantee’s em-
ployee, or a public interest group.179 Relatedly, the results of a grantee’s own 
audit or system of internal review may provoke additional oversight.180 
Third, agency offices that oversee cross-cutting conditions, such as antidis-
crimination guarantees, may review grantees’ compliance with these conditions 
separately from the grant program office’s review of administrative and pro-
grammatic compliance.181 Here, too, complaints by a private party may provoke 
review, as can the office’s review of suggestive data.182 
 
175. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 96.50 (2014); ED GRANTS HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at 119-29; HHS 
Grants Policy Statement, supra note 64, at I-82 to I-88. 
176. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(a) (2012).  
177. Id. § 4(a)(3). 
178. Id. §§ 4(a), 5. 
179. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., El Paso Independent School District’s Compliance with the 
Accountability and Academic Assessment Requirements of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 8-9 (June 2013), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live 
/media/site525/2013/0614/20130614_095948_episd_audit_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/Au5U 
-CLSB] (describing complaints by state officials and grantee employees that prompted re-
view).  
180. Federal law requires many grantees to conduct an audit each year. 31 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) 
(2012); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.501-.504 (2013). Some federal programs even require the existence of 
a state investigation arm (to ensure program integrity) that is run separately from the state 
agency that implements the grant program. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (2012) (requiring 
the creation of a state Medicaid fraud control unit). 
181. See generally U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING TO ENSURE EQUAL AC-
CESS TO EDUCATION (2012) [hereinafter ED OCR, EQUAL ACCESS] (describing their investi-
gation of civil rights violations by recipients of federal funds); DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COM-
MITTEES (2012) [hereinafter HHS OCR, JUSTIFICATIONS] (describing the work of the paral-
lel office in HHS). 
182. See, e.g., ED OCR, Equal Access, supra note 181, at 3; HHS OCR, JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 
181, at 3-4. 
  




When an agency finds something unsatisfactory in the grantee’s implemen-
tation, the first step is typically an effort to resolve the matter through technical 
assistance and/or informal negotiation.183 A more formal version of such action, 
available to some agencies, is to enter into a compliance agreement with the 
grantee.184 The compliance agreement is a type of regulatory settlement in 
which the grantee agrees to make particular changes over a specified period.185 
If the problem is that the grantee has spent federal funds on activities not 
permitted under the grant’s requirements, the agency may seek recoupment of 
the misspent funds, whether by requiring actual repayment by the grantee186 or 
by reducing a subsequent year’s allocation to the grantee by the amount in 
question.187 Some programs permit an additional fiscal penalty to be levied if 
the grantee’s misuse of federal funds was an intentional violation.188 Relatedly, 
the agency may “[d]isallow (that is, deny both use of funds and any applicable 
matching credit for) all or part of the cost of the activity or action not in com-
pliance.”189 In such a circumstance, the agency does not actually seek to recover 
misspent federal funds but simply requires the grantee to spend its own money 
on the activity in question and therefore to reallocate budgetary responsibility 
for it. 
For egregious or ongoing violations or more systemic problems internal to 
the grantee’s organization, the agency may declare the grantee “high risk,” a 
legal term of art that requires special conditions and restrictions on the grant 
award.190 For example, the agency might require the grantee to submit quarter-
ly financial and performance reports (instead of simply annual reports), to ob-
tain technical or management assistance, or to submit requests for reimburse-
 
183. See, e.g., DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 137; KEY, supra note 14, at 173-74; Paul T. 
Hill, Enforcement and Informal Pressure in the Management of Categorical Programs in Educa-
tion, RAND CORP. CTR. ED. FIN. & GOVERNANCE (1979). 
184. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1234f (2012). 
185. See id. 
186. See id. § 1234a. 
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
188. See id. § 609(a)(1)(B). 
189. 2 C.F.R. § 200.338(b) (2014); see 34 C.F.R. § 80.43(a)(2) (2014); DEMBLING & MASON, supra 
note 38, at 138-39. 
190. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.207 (2014); 34 C.F.R. § 80.12(a) (2014); see also DEMBLING & MASON, su-
pra note 38, at 125-36 (describing the “not unusual” process of adding “special conditions to 
the grant to deal with the special risks that are seen” in such instances); ED GRANTS HAND-
BOOK, supra note 173, at 97 (describing considerations for high-risk grantees); HHS Grants 
Policy Statement, supra note 64, at II-55, B-6 (same). 
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ment for particular costs instead of fully providing federal funds up front.191 
The agency must inform the grantee of the actions the grantee must take to 
remove the special conditions or restrictions, and the agency must specify a 
time frame for compliance.192  
Many times, one of these enforcement options will be the end of the mat-
ter. But if the grantee declines to comply or simply fails to comply over time, 
the agency may decide to take further enforcement action. Two sets of options 
remain. 
First, agencies may file a cease-and-desist complaint with the agency’s of-
fice of administrative law judges, giving rise to a hearing at which the agency 
seeks to establish the grantee’s noncompliance with the grant requirements and 
to secure an order demanding change in a problematic practice, policy, or pro-
cedure.193 Agencies may also refer a matter of noncompliance to the Depart-
ment of Justice for litigation.194 The goal of such a referral is a judicial version 
of the administrative cease-and-desist option. 
Second, under an OMB rule common to all grant-making agencies, agen-
cies may withhold grant funds to noncompliant grantees—what is popularly 
understood as a funding cut-off.195 In the common understanding, a funding 
 
191. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.207; 34 C.F.R. § 80.12(b) (2014); ED GRANTS HANDBOOK, supra note 173, 
at 121-23; DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 125-36. 
192. 34 C.F.R. § 80.12(c) (2014). 
193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1234(e) (2012) (ED provision permitting cease-and-desist complaints); CAP-
PALLI, supra note 12, § 8:51 (discussing role of agency Assistance Dispute Boards generally).  
194. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(3) (2012) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)); 7 C.F.R. § 276.5 (2013) (food stamps); Office for Civil RightS, Case Processing 
Manual, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. § 402 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs 
/ocrcpm.html#IV_2 [http://perma.cc/8AZR-TAE9] (antidiscrimination cross-cutting con-
ditions); cf. 34 C.F.R. § 80.43(a)(5) (2014) (A-102 common rule providing that agencies 
seeking to enforce grant conditions against grantee noncompliance may “[t]ake other reme-
dies that may be legally available”). Few grant-making agencies have their own litigating au-
thority. See generally Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litiga-
tion on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345 (2000) (considering the possible effects of 
DOJ’s litigation control and cautioning that DOJ must act as the agency’s lawyer, not its 
board of directors).  
195. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.338 (2014). While this OMB rule is common to all grant-making agen-
cies, the rule exempts a subset of programs from a variety of otherwise generally applicable 
requirements, including this withholding rule. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.101(d) (2014) (identifying 
certain grant programs that need not follow a selection of otherwise generally applicable 
pre-award requirements, including the elements of Subpart D—Post Federal Award Re-
quirements, the subpart in which the withholding rule falls). This is not to say that the 
agencies overseeing those exempted grant programs may not withhold funds, but only that 
withholding for those programs is governed by more specific statutory guidelines. See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. § 9858g(b)(2)(A)-(B) (specifying types of withholding that are permissible under 
that grant program in the case of grantee noncompliance); 2 C.F.R. § 200.101(d)(4) (2014) 
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cut-off suggests that the entire grant must be terminated, but in actuality, 
agencies’ options are more nuanced. Under the OMB common rule, agencies 
have three withholding options: to “[t]emporarily withhold cash payments 
pending correction of the deficiency”; to “[w]holly or partly suspend or termi-
nate the Federal award”; and/or to “[w]ithhold further Federal awards for the 
project or program.”196 Different statutory regimes may further specify the ex-
tent to which funding may be withheld and under what circumstances. For ex-
ample, instead of 100% of a grant, a smaller percentage of funds may be at 
stake—or perhaps only the amount allocated for a particular disputed activi-
ty.197 Similarly, only one entity of a number that make up the grantee may be 
subject to funding cut-offs.198 
Both the cease-and-desist and the withholding options involve formal ad-
ministrative processes.199 (Referral to DOJ leads to judicial process, of course, 
to the extent DOJ decides to pursue the case.200) These are not merely agency 
decisions by fiat. The processes typically require formal written notice of the 
preliminary departmental decision and provide an opportunity for the grantee 
to respond in writing or to request a hearing before an agency hearing officer 
or board.201 If a hearing ensues, discovery may be permitted, including docu-
ment production, written interrogatories, and depositions.202 At the hearing, 
the rules of evidence do not apply, but the hearing officer may exclude evidence 
that is irrelevant or immaterial, among other things.203 Agency officials as well 
as grantee officials may be called to testify.204 At the conclusion of the presenta-
tion of evidence, the hearing officer issues a formal written opinion, which may 
 
(exempting awards under the Child Care and Development Block Grant from the otherwise 
generally applicable requirements). 
196. 2 C.F.R. § 200.338(a), (c), (e) (2014). 
197. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1416(3)(B), 1417(h) (2012) (IDEA); 42 U.S.C. § 609 (2012) (TANF); 
7 C.F.R. § 276.1(a)(4) (2011) (food stamps). 
198. See, e.g., Civil Rights Div., Title VI Legal Manual § XI.C.2, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Jan. 11, 
2001), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZU3G 
-TAST] [hereinafter Title VI Manual] (discussing the pinpoint provision). 
199. CAPPALLI, supra note 12, at §§ 8-65 to -91; DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 161-70; 
KEY, supra note 14, at 157-59. 
200. See Herz & Devins, supra note 194, at 1366-67 (noting that DOJ does not bring every en-
forcement action referred by other agencies). 
201. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 938-39 (describing a typical agency dispute process). 
202. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1234(g) (2012).  
203. See id. 
204. Id. 
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be subject to appeal within the agency.205 The final agency decision is typically 
subject to review by a district court206 or the court of appeals with jurisdiction 
over the grantee.207 
*** 
To sum up, federal grants vary across different dimensions of their design; 
grantee rationales for noncompliance are similarly varied; and agency funding 
cut-offs are part of a broader set of grantee-agency interactions and agency 
procedures. The typical account of funding cut-offs does not engage with these 
realities. The next Part demonstrates how this lack of engagement renders the 
typical account inadequate. 
i i .  deconstructing the case against funding cut-offs  
For almost as long as the federal government has provided grant funds to 
states and localities,208 the possibility of withholding those funds in the event 
of noncompliance has existed. In 1890, for example, Congress included in the 
second Morrill Act (one of the first statutes to provide ongoing federal fund-
ing) a provision permitting the Secretary of the Interior to withhold funds 
from the land-grant colleges of each state; the Secretary attempted to exercise 
this authority the following year.209 In the 1930s, as federal grants expanded 
during the New Deal, the newly created Social Security Board sought to with-
hold funds from several states that were not in compliance with the Aid to De-
pendent Children welfare grant, and the Board used the threat of withholding 
funds to induce compliance in others.210 In the 1960s, the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare used its authority under Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act to order fund termination to numerous school districts 
throughout the South that were refusing to desegregate their schools;211 the 
 
205. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1234d(e)-(f) (2012) (ED grants generally); 7 C.F.R. § 276.7 (2013) 
(SNAP); 45 C.F.R. § 96.52 (2013) (Child Care and Development Block Grant). 
206. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2012) (TANF); 7 C.F.R. § 276.7(j) (2013) (SNAP). 
207. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1234g(b) (2012) (ED grants generally); 42 C.F.R. § 430.38(b)(1) (2013) 
(Medicaid); 42 C.F.R. § 457.208(b)(1) (2013) (CHIP). 
208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (referencing the rise of federal grants around the 
start of the twentieth century). 
209. See KEY, supra note 14, at 156-57, 161-62. In the decades that followed, grant legislation repli-
cated the Morrill Act’s statutory language on withholding, and agency officials overseeing 
federal grants for research, forestry, employment, and public roads sought to withhold those 
funds several times. Id. at 157-73. 
210. DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 98-115. 
211. See, e.g., In re Strong Sch. Dist. No. 83 & State Bd. of Educ., No. CR-303 (E.D. O.H.A. 
1967), 1967 WL 20261; In re Buford City Bd. of Educ. & State Bd. of Educ., No. CR-463 
 
  
the yale law journal 124:248   20 14  
284 
 
implicit threat of fund termination was also useful in promoting desegrega-
tion.212 In subsequent decades, agencies have continued to use the funding cut-
off, or the threat of funding termination, from time to time.213 It is therefore 
not surprising that, as OMB promulgated rules governing the administration 
of federal grants in the 1970s and updated them in the years since, the office 
has included the possibility of withholding as an enforcement mechanism.214 
At the same time, while agency efforts to withhold funds have persisted 
over time to some extent, use of this enforcement mechanism has generally re-
mained rare,215 and expressions of significant discomfort have surrounded the 
mechanism. This discomfort tends to be expressed not by way of sustained 
analysis of funding cut-offs but rather as part of some other discussion—for 
example, the coercive aspects of the intergovernmental grant system or the 
waning of private enforcement regimes.216 In the discussions that exist, howev-
er, it is possible to tease out four types of critiques of funding cut-offs that 
purport to explain why funding terminations are rare, why they should be rare, 
or both. 
The first critique posits that funding cut-offs should be disfavored because 
funding cut-offs hurt the beneficiaries of the grant and are thus counterpro-
ductive.217 This critique is at once normative, because it seeks to condemn the 
mechanism, and descriptive, because it seeks to explain why agency officials are 
(justifiably) reluctant to pursue it. 
The second critique again posits that funding cut-offs should be disfa-
vored, but this time takes the perspective of the grantees, not the beneficiaries: 
funding cut-offs undercut the central goals of federalism and should therefore 
be avoided.218 Like the first critique, this critique is at once normative and de-
 
(E.D. O.H.A. 1967), 1967 WL 20257; In re Clarke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. & State Bd. of Educ., 
No. CR-243 (E.D. O.H.A. 1967), 1967 WL 21738; In re Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. & Miss. 
Bd. of Educ., No. CR-61 (E.D. O.H.A. 1966), 1966 WL 19384. 
212. See, e.g., YUDOF ET AL., supra note 13; Cascio et al., supra note 13, at 445-49.  
213. See, e.g., CAPPALLI, supra note 12, § 8:06; Thomas Hehir, IDEA and Disproportionality: Feder-
al Enforcement, Effective Advocacy, and Strategies for Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 219, 224-28 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002). 
214. See 2013 Uniform Administrative Requirements, supra note 74, at 78,637 to 78,638; 53 Fed. 
Reg. 8,034, 8,102 (Mar. 11, 1988); 42 Fed. Reg. 45,828, 45,844 (Sept. 12, 1977); 39 Fed. Reg. 
35,787, 35,792 (Oct. 4, 1974).  
215. See supra note 14. 
216. See, e.g., Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Su-
preme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
283, 292 (1996); Ronald F. King, The Politics of Denial: The Use of Funding Penalties as an Im-
plementation Device for Social Policy, 20 POL’Y SCI. 307, 326, 331 (1987). 
217. See infra Part II.A. 
218. See infra Part II.B. 
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scriptive; to the extent that agency officials believe that federalism concerns 
surround funding cut-offs as a normative matter, it will help explain why 
funding cut-offs are uncommon. 
The third critique shifts gears away from the normative and toward the de-
scriptive. Even if funding cut-offs are desirable, this critique runs, they can 
never be a truly useful tool because, as a factual matter, agencies have little mo-
tivation or capacity to cut off funds.219 Grant-making agencies are designed to 
give money away, not take it away, and they cannot police every instance of 
noncompliance. 
The fourth critique follows this descriptive line of thinking: even if funding 
cut-offs are desirable, political interactions among states, agencies, Congress, 
and the White House make funding cut-offs almost impossible to achieve.220 
According to this critique, the utility of the enforcement mechanism is there-
fore extremely limited. 
Do these critiques accurately describe the actual beliefs of agency officials? 
It is difficult to say, as the literature has offered these critiques without much in 
the way of empirical evidence. Future empirical work interviewing agency offi-
cials about these questions will be useful. What it is possible to say now, how-
ever, is this: whether or not these critiques describe the beliefs of agency offi-
cials, the critiques are vastly oversimplified and often wrong. In other words, 
even if the critiques help explain why funding cut-offs are relatively rare, the 
critiques rest on unsupportable assumptions that ought to be challenged. 
This Part shows why. It assesses each of the four critiques and demon-
strates why each is unconvincing when seen in light of the disaggregation of 
grant-making offered in Part I. The work in this Part therefore sets the stage 
for the argument in Part III that certain circumstances call for serious consider-
ation of funding cut-offs and that different institutional design arrangements 
can help promote the appropriate use of this mechanism. 
A. Hurting Grant Beneficiaries 
The first critique is that funding cut-offs are a “blunderbuss weapon,”221 a 
sledgehammer instead of a scalpel, that ends up defeating the very purposes of 
the grant.222 If a grant is supposed to help a certain population receive particu-
 
219. See infra Part II.C. 
220. See infra Part II.D. 
221. Karlan, supra note 17, at 200. 
222. See, e.g., CAPPALLI, supra note 12, § 8:20; DERTHICK, supra note 96; KEY, supra note 14, at 
176; 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 7:14 (West 2014); Daniels, supra note 
50, at 455-56, 464-65; Hills, supra note 32, at 1227-28, 1260; Key, supra note 216, at 292-93; 
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lar benefits, the argument goes, and the grantee is not fully complying with the 
conditions of the grant, it would be foolhardy for the federal agency to with-
hold funds for the entire grant, which would presumably hurt the beneficiary 
population even more than the grantee’s noncompliance. 
Unpacking this claim, however, demonstrates that the realities are a little 
more complicated. The claim that funding cut-offs should be avoided because 
they hurt grant beneficiaries fails to account for the variety of limitations on 
withholding funds; fails to account for the variety of types of grants; insuffi-
ciently specifies a meaningful baseline of beneficiary welfare; insufficiently 
compares withholding to other available compliance mechanisms; and does not 
account for other responses to program noncompliance that may hurt benefi-
ciaries more than withholding funds does. 
1. The Variety of Limitations on Withholding 
Underlying the “hurting beneficiaries” critique is the assumption that the 
entire grant is always at issue. But as I demonstrated above, grants often con-
tain restrictions on just how much can be withheld for noncompliance—for ex-
ample, by limiting to a specific percentage or a range of percentages the 
amount that may be withheld for a particular set of violations, by establishing 
the precise entity within the grantee’s purview from which funds may be with-
held, or by clarifying the specific activity that the grantee may lose funding 
for.223 Even where no specific statutory limitation is in place, OMB rules com-
mon to many federal grant programs provide that agencies may withhold 
funds in whole or in part to remedy noncompliance.224 This type of withhold-
ing actually looks more like a scalpel than a sledgehammer. 
Moreover, because the point of withholding funds is to induce compliance, 
agencies do not (at least in the first instance) cut off funds to their grantees 
with an instruction never to return; instead, many grant statutes, regulations, 
and cut-off orders themselves state that the funds will be withheld until the 
grantee takes or ceases a particular action.225 Beneficiaries may therefore end up 
 
King, supra note 216, at 326, 331; Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement 
of Federal Standards in Grant-In-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. 
L. REV. 600, 631 (1972); Sam Bagenstos, Douglas and the Underenforcement of Federal Spend-
ing Conditions, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 3, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com 
/prawfsblawg/2012/05/douglas-and-the-underenforcement-of-federal-spending-conditions 
.html [http://perma.cc/VKD7-GTR8]. 
223. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
224. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.338 (2013). 
225. See, e.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1396, 1447 (E.D. O.H.A. 1992) (re-
citing stock language that “[t]his termination and refusal to grant or continue Federal finan-
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coming out ahead in the long run as a result of an agency’s decision to with-
hold funds, if the grantee improves its compliance in response. 
In addition, sometimes funds are withheld from the direct grantee but not 
sub-grantees. So, for example, where state administration of a grant is the 
problem, the agency may be able to withhold certain administrative funds from 
the state agency and distribute those same funds directly to local grantees.226 In 
this circumstance, although there is surely value in state administration, it is 
harder to make the case that the beneficiaries are actually harmed; there is no 
loss of money overall, and the money is distributed closer to the beneficiaries.  
It may also be the case that the federal agency could withhold grant funds 
from the government grantee and provide the service directly to beneficiaries 
or provide funds to private providers.227 This action may often be more difficult 
as a matter of capacity and politics, but it is another way in which the claim 
that funding cut-offs necessarily hurt grant beneficiaries is overstated. 
None of this is to say that beneficiaries will never be hurt by withholding or 
the threat of withholding. Even a temporary or narrow loss of funding may 
eliminate or suspend administrators’ or service providers’ jobs, for example, 
which may in turn negatively affect the grant’s substantive implementation. 
But, of course, agencies only act to cut off funds once they have determined 
that what the state grantee is doing or failing to do is not in the beneficiaries’ 
best interests. If the grantee ends up complying after a cut-off, then the benefi-
ciaries of the grant will come out ahead. Claims that beneficiaries will be hurt 
thus must be supported by specific analysis of what is at issue in any given case 
of withholding and by a comparison to the alternatives to agency action. 
2. The Variety of Types of Grants 
The extent to which grant beneficiaries may suffer from a funding cut-off 
also likely differs depending on the type of grant at issue. For example, the loss 
of a short-term project grant likely affects beneficiary welfare differently than 
the loss of a long-term formula grant; there are fewer reliance interests at stake 
in the former, and the grant may be less entrenched in the structure of the 
 
cial assistance shall remain in force until [grantee] corrects its noncompliance” and assures 
future compliance); 49 C.F.R. § 384.403(b) (2013) (Department of Transportation regula-
tion providing that in certain circumstances withheld funds may be returned to a previously 
noncompliant state grantee once the state has come into “substantial compliance”). 
226. See, e.g., State of California, No. 09-05-R, Order re Assistant Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss 
the Application, Nov. 4, 2009, at 3. 
227. See, e.g., KEY, supra note 14, at 161, 172-73, 176; Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and 
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 
YALE L.J. 534, 585-86 (2011); Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 661 n.530. 
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grantee’s administration. Similarly, the loss of a grant designed to compensate 
for federal externalities likely affects beneficiary welfare differently than the 
loss of a grant designed to promote certain national priorities that might be less 
of a priority within the state or local jurisdiction that receives funds; beneficiar-
ies may care more about, and therefore suffer more from the loss of, the former 
than the latter. Whether and how beneficiaries will suffer as a result of with-
holding depends in part on the structure and goals of the type of grant at issue. 
3. The Baseline 
Another way of framing the “hurting beneficiaries” critique of withholding 
is that it takes as an acceptable baseline for measuring beneficiary welfare the 
current state of affairs, ignoring the question of whether this is the appropriate 
baseline. This assumption is counterproductive. Game theory suggests that se-
rious enforcement tools such as funding cut-offs may play a powerful role in 
inducing compliance even if they are never used because of the threat that they 
might be.228 But the key to this assumption is that the other side must think 
that there is a chance that the serious enforcement tools may be used.229 If 
grantees know that the federal agency is reluctant to withhold funds on the 
theory that it wants to avoid hurting beneficiaries, grantees may go as close to 
the compliance line as possible. An agency’s demonstrated disinclination to 
withhold funds can end up holding the beneficiaries hostage to the grantee’s 
current noncompliance and may therefore have destructive long-term conse-
quences that work against the stated goal of helping beneficiaries. 
Two parallel issues in grant implementation shed further light on this as-
sumption. One is the question of the appropriate balance between the breadth 
and depth of service provision in a given grant—or, put another way, between 
quantity and quality.230 The other is the question of the appropriate balance be-
tween spending on grant administration and enforcement, on the one hand, 
and service provision, on the other.231 In both of these cases, the balance is ap-
 
228. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 50, at 446. 
229. Id. at 490-91. 
230. See, e.g., DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 12 (2001) (dis-
cussing the “quality-quantity trade-off”). 
231. Compare Reform of Federal Policies Relating to Grants and Cooperative Agreements, supra 
note 79, at 7283 (discussing the need to “allow recipients of Federal awards to re-orient ef-
forts spent on compliance with complex requirements towards achievement of programmat-
ic objectives”), with Federal Grants: Improvements Needed in Oversight and Accountability Pro-
cess: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & 
Procurement Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Jeanette M. Franzel, Managing Direc-
tor of GAO, Financial Management and Assurance), http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
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propriately seen as a series of tradeoffs. The debate over withholding funds 
ought to take the same shape, acknowledging case-specific tradeoffs without 
assuming that the current state of affairs is the proper baseline. 
The argument that beneficiaries suffer when funds are withheld makes 
other assumptions about the proper baseline as well—for example, by assum-
ing that the beneficiaries currently served by the grantee are the only benefi-
ciaries to consider. However, there are circumstances in which withheld funds 
may be redistributed to other grantees, rather than being kept from grantee use 
at all.232 In these cases, beneficiaries served by other grantees come out ahead. 
It is thus not that beneficiary welfare is reduced overall across all grantees, but 
that the distribution of welfare has shifted away from the noncompliant grant-
ee and toward compliant grantees. One may prefer as a normative matter that 
grant funds be distributed equally across all jurisdictions, but a heavier concen-
tration of funds in some grantees is not the same thing as an undifferentiated 
claim that a cut-off will hurt the beneficiaries. (And given the current political 
dynamics of grant funding formulas, it is already not the case that grant funds 
are distributed in equal shares across all jurisdictions.233) 
4. Comparisons to Other Compliance Mechanisms 
The claim that withholding hurts beneficiaries also fails to situate with-
holding within the context of other available compliance mechanisms. For ex-
ample, as I explained earlier, agencies may seek to recoup funds spent for im-
proper purposes or without sufficient documentation.234 It is rarely claimed 
that recoupment is improper. But beneficiaries can also be hurt by recoupment. 
The agency might lower its future grant payments as a way of recovering what 
it is owed; the grantee might have to find other funds in its budget to repay the 
 
/d11773t.pdf [http://perma.cc/L98T-LVBE] (discussing the need to provide more oversight 
in the management of federal grants). 
232. See, e.g., Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 
§ 1514, 127 Stat. 198, 425 (providing for the reallocation of education funds); 384 C.F.R. § 
401 (federal highway funds); Reallotment of FY 2013 Funds for the Low Income Home En-
ergy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), 79 Fed. Reg. 2446 (Jan. 14, 2014) (providing notice of 
determination about reallotment of unused funds under the Low Income Home Energy As-
sistance Program); Notice on Reallotment of Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Title I For-
mula Allotted Funds for Dislocated Worker Activities for Program Year (PY) 2012, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 19,736 (Apr. 2, 2013) (same for funds under the Workforce Investment Act). 
233. See, e.g., Frances E. Lee, Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives: Coalition 
Building and Distribution of Benefits, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 714, 722 (2003); Frances E. Lee, Rep-
resentation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Dis-
tribution of Federal Funds, 60 J. POL. 34, 46 & tbl.2 (1998). 
234. See supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text. 
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agency.235 Either way, beneficiaries would at some level be better off if the 
grantee could simply apologize for the misspent funds and move on. Yet agen-
cies act to recoup funds on the understanding that beneficiaries will at another 
level be better off if grantees are encouraged to spend their money on the pur-
poses of the grant. The same logic applies to withholding as a tool to promote 
broader compliance. 
Nor is it necessarily the case that alternative compliance mechanisms—such 
as an administrative cease-and-desist order, referral to the Department of Jus-
tice for litigation, or even a private lawsuit—are preferable to withholding be-
cause they hurt beneficiaries less, in theory by accomplishing the same substan-
tive outcome on behalf of grant beneficiaries without posing any loss of federal 
dollars.236 An administrative cease-and-desist order needs some enforcement 
backstop to ensure that it is followed—indeed, one of the mechanisms by 
which cease-and-desist orders can be enforced is through a funding cut-off.237 
The risk of funding loss therefore remains. 
As for DOJ referral, a court order has its own compliance mechanism built 
in: contempt proceedings.238 But a contempt order is generally enforced 
through the threat of financial penalties.239 Given this threat, it is not clear why 
referral would be better for beneficiaries than the threat of withholding funds 
through the agency’s own funding cut-off procedures. A private lawsuit for 
damages, as permitted by some grant regimes, carries the same financial 
risks.240 Such a lawsuit could also be said to hurt grant beneficiaries overall, 
even if it benefits the individual private plaintiff, to the extent that the grantee 
has to use funding allocated for service provision to pay the award—or to the 
extent that the grantee provides fewer services to pay insurance premiums 
against litigation risk. 
 
235. See id. 
236. This is not to say that these other compliance mechanisms should be disfavored; they also 
serve useful roles in an overall enforcement regime. The point is simply that it is not clear 
that these other compliance mechanisms are superior with respect to avoiding harm to bene-
ficiaries. 
237. See 20 U.S.C. § 1234e(e) (2012) (describing mechanisms to enforce an administrative cease-
and-desist order). 
238. FED. R. CIV. P. 70(e). 
239. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 441-42 (2009) (describing contempt proceedings, includ-
ing a financial penalty, against a state that refused to comply with a federal court order). 
240. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644-45 (1999) (defining the 
scope of a damages remedy in certain lawsuits brought under Title IX); see also id. at 680-81 
(“[S]chool liability in one peer sexual harassment suit could approach, or even exceed, the 
total federal funding of many school districts.”) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, any of these mechanisms carries the risk that the grantee will 
choose to walk away from the grant as opposed to comply with its terms.241 Be-
cause withholding poses no greater risk on this front, the choice from the per-
spective of helping grant beneficiaries is not between withholding and the oth-
er mechanisms, but between undertaking any enforcement action and permit-
permitting the grantee to continue in a state of noncompliance. Alternatively, 
just as a grantee may decide to comply with a declaratory judgment or an in-
junction without risking contempt penalties, or may achieve a private settle-
ment without incurring damages, so too may a grantee decide to comply with 
grant requirements in light of an administrative law judge’s order that failure 
to do so will result in immediate withholding. An agency’s taking any enforce-
ment action, even moving to withhold funds, might therefore well induce 
compliance without the grantee’s losing any funds in the end at all.  
5. Other Consequences of Program Noncompliance 
As a comparison to withholding, it is helpful to think about collateral con-
sequences of official action in response to program noncompliance in other 
grant-related contexts. With regard to welfare payments, for example, Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) places certain requirements on the 
individual beneficiary, such as attending work or school,242 fulfilling child sup-
port obligations,243 or even, in some states, passing a drug test.244 If the indi-
vidual beneficiary fails to meet these requirements, TANF benefits may be re-
 
241. When faced with a court order to comply with the conditions on a federal grant to serve 
homeless children, in a lawsuit brought by private parties, for example, the District of Co-
lumbia simply decided to stop taking funds for the program. See Lampkin v. District of Co-
lumbia, 886 F. Supp. 56, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1995); JoAnn Grozuczak Goedert, The Education of 
Homeless Children: The McKinney Act and Its Implications, 140 ED. L. REP. 9, 16-17 (2000) 
(discussing the aftermath of Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 879 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 
1995)). 
242. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2012) (work requirements); id. § 608(b) (“[i]ndividual re-
sponsibility plans”); see also GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32748, THE TEMPORARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING 
AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 14-18 (2013). 
243. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2012). 
244. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2012) (permitting states to “test[] welfare recipients for use of 
controlled substances” and to “sanction[] welfare recipients who test positive for use of  
controlled substances”); Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance,  
NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human 
-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx [http://perma.cc/37N3-7K58] (explaining 
that at least eleven states have imposed such requirements on beneficiaries and that at least 
eighteen additional states are considering such requirements in 2014). 
  
the yale law journal 124:248   20 14  
292 
 
duced or terminated.245 In these circumstances, the collateral consequences of 
agency action for noncompliance are even more extreme than in the context of 
withholding funds for grantee noncompliance, in that specifically identifiable 
innocent third-party dependents will suffer from the absence of cash support 
and other corollary losses (such as the loss or decrease in food stamps that may 
accompany a sanction under TANF).246 These consequences can be even 
harsher than the consequences of withholding funds for grantee noncompli-
ance. For example, after a sanction, the food stamps statute requires a waiting 
period before the beneficiary regains eligibility for the benefit, and a resump-
tion of eligibility is not typically accompanied by back payments.247 
There are a host of political reasons (lying beyond the scope of this Article) 
that explain why individual benefit cut-offs are a robust part of the American 
enforcement conversation and yet agency funding cut-offs are not.248  
Moreover, one might object to the individual benefit cut-offs I just described 
on multiple grounds, both constitutional and policy-related, that also lie be-
yond the scope of this Article.249 I simply use this comparison as another way 
to show the substantive weakness of the generic “hurting beneficiaries” argu-
ment against funding cut-offs: our enforcement system already permits such 
 
245. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 607(e), 608(a)(2), 608(b)(3) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 862b; FALK, supra note 
242, at 15. 
246. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1)(A) (2013) (declaring individuals ineligible for food stamps if they 
refuse employment, refuse to provide employment information to a state agency, or quit 
without good cause); id. § 2015(d)(1)(B) (permitting states to make the entire household in-
eligible for food stamps for a parent’s failure to meet work requirements); id. § 2015(i) 
(permitting states to disqualify an individual from participating in the food stamps program 
if that individual was similarly disqualified from another means-tested program). 
247. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(1)(B)-(C); see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.7(f)(2), (5) (2012) (defining dis-
qualification periods); id. § 273.17(a) (2012) (limiting circumstances under which state agen-
cies may restore lost household benefits). 
248. The political power of state governments as compared to that of people in poverty may be 
one such reason, as Michael Katz’s assessment of the 1996 welfare reform demonstrates viv-
idly. See MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WEL-
FARE IN AMERICA 300-34 (tenth anniversary ed. 1996). Another possible explanation might 
stem from the contrast between the longstanding American traditions of (on the one hand) 
treating individual welfare recipients as those to be “pitied but not entitled” and attempting 
“to make the poor less poor by making them more virtuous” and (on the other hand) the 
equally longstanding political concerns about federalism. On the former, see generally, for 
example, LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY 
OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); and JOEL SCHWARTZ, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH VIRTUE: 
MORAL REFORM AND AMERICA’S URBAN POOR, 1825-2000, at xv (2000). On the latter, see, 
for example, infra Part II.B. 
249. See, for example, the ACLU’s ongoing coverage of drug testing and benefits. Drug Testing 
Welfare Recipients, ACLU: BLOG OF RIGHTS, https://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/drug-testing 
-welfare-recipients [http://perma.cc/7AAT-6T7F]. 
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consequences in the context of benefit cut-offs, and the system therefore 
should take more seriously the prospect of holding state and local grantees ac-
countable, especially when accountability is designed to improve the lot of ben-
eficiaries rather than to punish grantees. 
B. Undercutting Federalism 
The second critique of funding cut-offs is rooted in federalism concerns. 
This argument suggests that, as both a constitutional and a policy matter, fed-
eral agencies should operate with a light touch in enforcing conditions against 
states and localities. In scholarship and doctrine, this argument is usually 
framed as one that challenges the constitutionality and desirability of laws that 
offer a grant in exchange for compliance with the attached conditions, rather 
than as one that challenges agency use of funding cut-offs per se.250 In practice, 
however, grantees sometimes respond to actual or potential threats of funding 
cut-offs with federalism rhetoric, without considering the question of whether 
the grant itself raises federalism problems.251 
 
250. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-05 (2012) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 2663-64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Va. Dep’t of 
Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting); 
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimen-
sions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 36-42 (2001); James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable 
Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, 
2011-2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 107-08; Somin, supra note 39, at 462-63. Politicians have 
also employed the rhetoric of federalism to object to giving agencies funding cut-off au-
thority in the first place. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 154, 191 n.178 (2011) (describing the reluctance of President Kennedy and 
his congressional counterparts to embrace what became Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, viewing it “as an affront to localism in education, and as a potentially dangerous accu-
mulation of federal power”). 
251. See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, Jerry Brown Pushes School Testing Delay Despite Federal Threats, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.mercedsunstar.com/2013/09/11/3215525/jerry 
-brown-pushes-school-testing.html [http://perma.cc/E9UV-8QEG] (quoting the state su-
perintendent of instruction’s response to the Education Department’s threat to withhold 
funds for noncompliance with the testing regime: “I’m disappointed someone in Washing-
ton would want to interfere in the legislative process in California.”); see also Riley, 106 F.3d 
at 562 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“Bringing the full weight of the Federal Government to bear 
against the Commonwealth’s educational policy decision . . . the Department of Education 
has, in the first such enforcement action ever against a state, withheld Virginia’s entire [spe-
cial education] grant until the Commonwealth capitulates to the Department’s demands  
. . . .”); KEY, supra note 14, at 177 (positing that the Vocational Education Division “appar-
ently fears that drastic action would give substance to the unfounded but recurrent charges 
of ‘federal dictation’ over a function historically locally controlled”). 
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Because the case against funding cut-offs on federalism grounds is closely 
related to the case against conditional spending, it is worth teasing out the 
ways in which the traditional federalism argument applies—and does not ap-
ply—in the funding cut-off context, after Congress has designed a federal grant 
program and the grantee has already accepted the grant. Taken seriously, and 
articulated more than is typical, an argument against funding cut-offs based on 
federalism concerns has four components: protecting sovereignty and autono-
my, preventing coercion, promoting diversity, and enhancing accountability. 
None of these rationales can withstand the weight that needs to be put upon it 
in opposing funding cut-offs.252 
1. Protecting Sovereignty and Autonomy  
The project of American federalism is based on the idea that the Framers 
“split the atom of sovereignty” in our constitutional democracy.253 The sover-
eignty aspect of the federalism case against funding cut-offs argues that agen-
cies should not threaten to withhold funds from states because to do so would 
upset the states’ prerogative to make policy decisions about their own internal 
structure and for their own citizens.254 As a formal matter, sovereignty is a con-
cept that is limited to the states; “[l]ocalities occupy a quasi-constitutional 
nether realm”255 instead of constituting “anything approximating coequal sov-
ereigns.”256 But a longstanding tradition of local autonomy in both law and 
rhetoric gives rise to arguments against cutting off grant funds to local gov-
 
252. For the purposes of this section, I accept these values of federalism as normatively desirable, 
seeking to show only that funding cut-offs need not undercut them, while leaving questions 
about their normative desirability to others. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 
II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 446, 453 (1990) (describing local au-
tonomy as “normatively ambiguous” and a potential “obstacle to efforts to reduce inequality 
and ameliorate class and race antagonisms”); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: 
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) 
(arguing that a focus on subnational diversity has failed to produce substantively good out-
comes in the area of antipoverty law). 
253. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
254. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 564 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (rejecting an agency’s effort to cut off funds 
because nothing “in the purpose of [the grant statute] suggest[s] that the State is required 
to succumb to the Federal Government’s demands”); cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the potential of the spending power 
to “permit[] the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional 
state concern”); Somin, supra note 39, at 482 (arguing that federal grants generally lead to 
“loss of control over the executive and legislative machinery of state government”). 
255. Davidson, supra note 85, at 977. 
256. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 390 (2001). 
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ernments; these arguments bear a strong resemblance to the sovereignty ar-
gument against cutting off grant funds to states.257 
One of the justifications for “[o]ur [f]ederalism,”258 however, and one of 
the values behind protecting state sovereignty and local autonomy against the 
encroachment of federal authority is to protect citizens against government 
abuses; it is not simply to protect sovereignty or autonomy as a good in and of 
itself.259 To the extent that state or local grantees are causing injury to grant 
beneficiaries by not complying with the terms of the grant, this liberty-
enhancing end of federalism is served, rather than undercut, by federal en-
forcement against the grantees.260 
Moreover, a shared interest in sovereignty and autonomy need not point in 
the same direction for all states and localities at the same time. For example, 
while one state or locality that is out of compliance with its water pollution 
control grants may not want EPA interference with its decisions on water man-
agement, a neighboring state or locality suffering from pollution spillovers may 
well want federal enforcement against the offending grantee to preserve the 
ability of the neighboring state or locality to take advantage of its own sover-
 
257. See, e.g., Applebome, supra note 11 (quoting a county official’s response to the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development’s threat to withhold funds for noncompliance with an-
tidiscrimination requirements connected to federal grants: “Washington bureaucrats, who 
you will never see or meet, want the power to determine who will live where and how each 
neighborhood will look. . . . What’s at stake is the fundamental right of our cities, towns 
and villages to plan and zone for themselves.”). On local autonomy more generally, see, for 
example, Barron, supra note 256, at 393-97; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The 
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Briffault, supra note 252; 
and Davidson, supra note 85, at 994-98. 
258. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see also Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1553-56 (2012) (discussing a variety of interests related to state 
sovereignty and autonomy). 
259. As Justice Kennedy recently wrote for a unanimous court in Bond v. United States, “Federal-
ism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of gov-
ernment for their own integrity. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, feder-
alism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power. . . . 
By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, 
federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.” 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 
(2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (describing as “[p]erhaps the principal benefit of the federalist sys-
tem . . . a check on abuses of government power” in order “to ensure the protection of our 
fundamental liberties,” and quoting Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in support of 
this point (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
260. This is not to suggest that federalism would support all federal intrusions any time states or 
localities harm individuals, but merely that if one value of vertical federalism is to “en-
hance[] freedom . . . by protecting the people,” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364, federal enforcement 
of intergovernmental grants enhances rather than undercuts this value. 
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eignty or autonomy.261 One jurisdiction may object on autonomy grounds to 
HUD’s efforts to withhold funds for noncompliance with antidiscrimination 
mandates in housing grants, but neighboring jurisdictions may find their own 
autonomy compromised unless HUD takes action, given externalities in re-
gional housing markets.262 Judge Barron states more generally a point that also 
applies specifically to funding cut-offs: “The intuitive notion that freedom 
from central command protects local autonomy obscures the way in which a 
central law may (re)distribute local autonomy.”263 
The sovereignty and autonomy argument against withholding funds is fur-
ther limited by the fact that there are many reasons why state or local govern-
ment grantees may be out of compliance with grant conditions. Many of these 
reasons—such as mismanagement and bureaucratic inadequacy—have nothing 
to do with state or local policy choices.264 There is no need for special solici-
tousness for states and localities when no state or local policy choice is actually 
at issue. 
On the other hand, when state or local policy choices actually are at issue, 
bringing to a head conflict between the agency and the grantee over the sub-
stance of the noncompliance may actually be valuable from the state’s or locali-
ty’s perspective. Somewhat counterintuitively, such a public conflict permits 
the subnational governments to set the agenda; it gives them the opportunity 
to attempt to reshape the substance of the law both within the agency and 
within Congress.265 
Furthermore, nothing about the sovereignty or autonomy argument is 
unique to withholding as opposed to other mechanisms of ensuring grant 
compliance. For example, there is no reason for a state or local grantee to prefer 
agency referral to DOJ for litigation or a private plaintiff’s lawsuit; appearing 
in court and appearing in the agency are both intrusive, from the grantee’s per-
 
261. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Program Grants (Section 106), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http:// 
water.epa.gov/grants_funding/cwf/pollutioncontrol.cfm [http://perma.cc/VJ74-52AT] (de-
scribing such grants); Barron, supra note 256, at 387, 416-19 (discussing interstate conflicts 
over pollution); David S. Beckman, The Threats to Our Drinking Water, N.Y. TIMES,  
Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/opinion/the-threats-to-our-drinking 
-water.html [http://perma.cc/79P2-2NQ2] (noting upstream water pollution problems neg-
atively affecting different communities downstream). 
262. See, e.g., Applebome, supra note 11 (describing one county’s objection to HUD’s decision to 
withdraw grant funds for such noncompliance); Briffault, supra note 257, at 41 (describing 
interjurisdictional spillovers of individual localities’ exclusionary housing decisions). 
263. Barron, supra note 256, at 415-16. 
264. See supra notes 139-155 and accompanying text. 
265. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1287, 1292-93. I address the political aspect of 
funding cut-offs infra Part II.D. 
  
agency enforcement of spending clause statutes 
297 
 
spective, and both are designed to get the grantee to do something that it 
would prefer not to do. In addition, the grantee can end up in federal court ei-
ther way, from a court injunction or from a petition for review of an agency de-
cision to cut off funds, and there is no obvious reason why the former would be 
preferable. The sovereignty and autonomy arguments against withholding are 
thus not really about withholding at all, but instead are arguments against 
compliance—or cover for arguments opposing the federal grants regime over-
all. 
From this perspective, the sovereignty and autonomy arguments against 
withholding are hard to justify. After the state or locality has already accepted 
the grant, it is more respectful of states and localities, not less, to treat them as 
valid contracting partners.266 To eschew efforts to keep states and localities to 
their side of the bargain places them in the position of an incompetent who 
needs to be protected from a deal and therefore whose contracting decisions 
should not be upheld as a matter of public policy.267 The point is slightly less 
forceful in the context of federal grants to localities that come via state-run 
formula sub-grants rather than via competitive grants for which localities have 
applied directly; localities tend to exercise their autonomy more in applying for 
the latter, receiving the former simply by dint of their role as constituent parts 
of the state.268 But even as to localities’ more passive receipt of sub-grants, an 
autonomy-based argument against withholding is less about withholding as a 
mechanism than it is a challenge to the system of intergovernmental grants as a 
whole; it is not the withholding of grants that arguably limits local autonomy, 
after all, but the obligation to accept and comply with the grants. The autono-
my concern is valid, but it should not be confused with an attack on funding 
cut-offs. 
2. Preventing Coercion 
As the Supreme Court recently underscored in NFIB v. Sebelius, expansive 
though the spending power may be, it does not permit coercion of states into 
following federal dictates.269 The doctrinal case against funding cut-offs is thus 
 
266. Cf. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983) (“Requiring States to honor the obligations 
voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of 
funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty.”). 
267. See, e.g., Super, supra note 40, at 2584 (calling such treatment of states “extreme and, indeed, 
quite insulting”). 
268. Davidson, supra note 85, at 973-74 (referencing these two kinds of federal-local interac-
tions). 
269. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (plurality opinion); id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting). 
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that agency action to withhold funds for grantee noncompliance is unconstitu-
tionally coercive.270 
While the Court’s introduction of the new coercion doctrine in NFIB was 
hardly a model of clarity, the best reading of the case is that the doctrine has 
three parts: for a condition to be unconstitutionally coercive, (1) the condition 
must “threaten to take away funds for a program that is separate and inde-
pendent from the program to which the condition in question is attached”; (2) 
states must not have had “sufficient notice at the time they accepted funds for 
the first program that they would also have to comply with the second pro-
gram”; and (3) “the amount of funding at stake” must be “so significant that 
the threat to withdraw it constitutes what the [NFIB] plurality calls ‘economic 
dragooning.’”271 Put more thematically, the doctrine sets forth an “anti-
leveraging principle,” under which a condition is unconstitutionally coercive 
“when Congress takes an entrenched federal program that provides large sums 
to the states and tells states they can continue to participate in that program 
only if they also agree to participate in a separate and independent program.”272 
Against this background, the doctrinal case against funding cut-offs begins 
to disintegrate. First, because the Supreme Court rooted the rationale for coer-
cion in the states’ existence as sovereigns,273 and because (as explained above) 
the law does not treat localities as sovereigns,274 the coercion doctrine seems 
limited to the protection of state governments, not local governments, at least 
as a formal matter.275 It is not inconceivable that the doctrine could be extended 
to apply to local governments as well,276 but for both constitutional reasons 
 
270. See, e.g., id. at 2602 (plurality opinion); Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569-71 
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, 
Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1322 (2013) (“[G]overnment may not withhold benefits it would oth-
erwise provide for the purpose either of discouraging agents from exercising their constitu-
tional rights or of punishing them for doing so.”); id. at 1329-33 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s pre-NFIB coercion case, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), was “wrongly 
decided” because the threatened loss of 5% of a state’s federal highway grant for failure to 
raise the drinking age was coercive). 
271. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 583. 
272. Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 865. 
273. See Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 652-53 (citing the NFIB Court’s repeated references to the 
constitutional status of the states in crafting the coercion doctrine). 
274. See supra notes 255-256 and accompanying text. 
275. See Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 652-53. 
276. See Davidson, supra note 85, at 983-84 (discussing the Supreme Court’s conflation of local 
governments with states in certain instances). 
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(that is, states have a constitutional status that local governments do not)277 
and practical reasons (that is, the ambiguity of the proper denominator against 
which to measure the significance of the amount of funding at stake),278 the ex-
tension seems unlikely.279 Any coercion argument against withholding funds 
from local grantees thus seems doomed. 
Second, the coercion argument seems to be limited to formula grants and 
inapplicable to project grants. Project grants are typically much smaller than 
formula grants; their conditions are typically tied clearly to the funding of-
fered; and grantees typically have clear expectations about the length of the 
project and any intermediate metrics to meet, or steps to follow, in order to re-
lease subsequent sums of project money.280 These characteristics do not over-
lap with the NFIB Court’s concerns. 
Even when the coercion argument is limited to state governments’ formula 
grants, the argument is no stronger. The coercion claim is not really about the 
act of withholding funds, after all, but about the constitutionality of the under-
lying statute. At bottom, the argument challenges the offer of funds in the first 
place, not the act of moving to take them away; Congress’s action matters, not 
the agency’s.281 The NFIB Court made this clear by focusing on the statutory 
text permitting the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold all 
Medicaid funds for a state not participating in the Medicaid expansion, even 
though there was no indication that the Secretary actually would have used 
that authority.282 This distinction between coercion in the context of agency ac-
tion and coercion in the context of congressional action makes sense. Given the 
 
277. See id. at 976-77 (discussing complicated constitutional status of localities); id. at 990-1000 
(discussing broader disaggregation of states and local governments). 
278. See Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 652-55 (arguing that, in contrast to state budgets, which pro-
vide a logical denominator against which to measure the coercive effect of the loss of federal 
funds, the denominator is less clear when local agencies’ funds are being threatened, because 
there are logical reasons to select the local agency’s budget, the broader local jurisdiction’s 
budget, or the state budget as a whole, and observing that the answer might vary by juris-
diction even if one denominator is selected). 
279. Cf. Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. 
REV. 339, 378-79 (predicting that the new coercion doctrine will have limited staying power 
and that lower courts will find lines of retreat). 
280. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
281. Indeed, in keeping with this insight, most scholarship on coercion under the spending pow-
er addresses the constitutionality of the federal grants regime as a whole, not particular in-
stances of agency threats to withhold funds. See Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 372-80 (as-
sessing this scholarship); supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
282. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659-60 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2641 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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substantive and procedural protections for participants in the withholding pro-
cess,283 an agency action to withhold funds is simply not the right subject of a 
coercion challenge, even though an action challenging the constitutionality of 
the underlying statute might be. (Nor would a coercion challenge brought in 
response to agency withholding likely be successful on the merits, as I discuss 
in Part II.C, where I explain why agencies ought not fear the prospect of a co-
ercion challenge to the grant statutes they implement.) 
3. Promoting Diversity 
State and local government diversity is one of the values that the American 
system of federalism is supposed to protect. In Justice Brandeis’s famous meta-
phor, each state is a “laboratory” of democracy that may “try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”284 The contem-
porary version of this principle posits that subnational governmental entities 
should be encouraged to experiment, both because different policies will work 
differently in different places and because experimentation may lead to a better 
understanding of what programs work and should be replicated more broad-
ly.285 The federalism-as-diversity case against agency funding cut-offs holds 
that agencies should not act to cut off federal funds from noncompliant grant-
ees—states and localities alike—because to do so would suppress valuable di-
versity in the service of less optimal uniformity.286 
Like the sovereignty argument, however, the diversity argument errone-
ously assumes that grantee noncompliance reflects substantive policy disa-
greements rather than mismanagement, insufficient effort, or some other rea-
son not in keeping with the value of policy diversity.287 The diversity argument 
also erroneously assumes that any move to withhold funds would be for non-
 
283. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text. 
284. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
285. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 85, at 1007, 1013-14; Somin, supra note 39, at 464-68. But cf. 
Super, supra note 252 (arguing that “democratic experimentalism” connected to policy diver-
sity has produced “laboratories of destitution,” rather than laboratories of democracy, in the 
field of antipoverty law). 
286. See, e.g., Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., dissent-
ing); Applebome, supra note 11; Gutierrez, supra note 251; Michele McNeil, Ed. Sec. Dun-
can’s Policy Leverage May Be Put to Test, EDUC. WK., Oct. 9, 2013, http://www.edweek.org 
/ew/articles/2013/10/09/07leverage_ep.h33.html [http://perma.cc/T8HH-4XC6] (quoting 
Georgia’s Superintendent of Schools, who objected to the Education Department’s plan to 
revoke grant funds for noncompliance: “[T]he heavier the stick, the more the states are go-
ing to pull back. We do not want to be forced into directions that we may or may not agree 
with.”). 
287. See supra notes 139-155 and accompanying text. 
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compliance with a uniform federal policy. That is far from the case. States can 
be found out of compliance with their own state plans in formula grants,288 for 
example, and all grantees may be found out of compliance with their own spe-
cific applications in competitive grants.289 
Moreover, even when the possibility of withholding is due to noncompli-
ance with a uniform federal policy, the diversity argument is better directed 
toward the initial design of the uniform federal policy than to the back end of 
grant enforcement. The diversity argument does not meaningfully speak to 
whether grantees that have accepted federal funds to do something—even 
something arising from a one-size-fits-all policy—should be relieved of the ob-
ligation to comply. 
It is possible, however, that agency reluctance to cut off funds could be seen 
as relevant to policy diversity if the decision to continue providing funds is a 
substitute for this front-end design change. In other words, if it is easier for 
advocates to persuade an agency not to cut off funds to grantees that are engag-
ing in impermissible program variance than to persuade Congress to redesign a 
grant program in a way that furthers policy diversity, then the former choice 
makes more sense. Although I am not aware of any evidence that this is true as 
a descriptive matter, it is a plausible story. 
As a normative matter, however, if agency reluctance to cut off funds for 
noncompliance is traceable to agency interest in furthering policy diversity 
even when the statute does not permit it, such action (or inaction) is destruc-
tive, rather than something to celebrate. Justice Brandeis also wrote in praise of 
openness and transparency, after all: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”290 Our system relies on 
the existence of laws that are public. If the law on the books—the federal condi-
tions—is without force because agency enforcers are encouraged to look away 
for unrelated policy reasons, our democracy suffers. In such a context, it would 
be better for the agency to grant a waiver (publicly, on the record) than to fail 
to enforce grant conditions. 
In any event, regardless of whether the story is true, the diversity case 
against funding cut-offs seems to be a cover for a broader objection to the fed-
eral grant regime, and so should be taken in that light. 
 
288. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(b) (2013) (identifying the possibility of withholding Medicaid 
funds if a state is not in compliance with its own state plan). 
289. See, e.g., Georgia in Doghouse on Race to Top, EDUC. WK., Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.edweek 
.org/ew/articles/2013/08/07/37policy.h32.html [http://perma.cc/7FGC-ENPN] (describing 
the Department of Education’s decision to withhold part of Georgia’s Race to the Top funds 
because of the state’s efforts to walk away from commitments made in its applications for 
the grant money). 
290. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
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4. Enhancing Accountability 
Another value the system of federalism promotes is political accountabil-
ity.291 Under this principle, intergovernmental relations should be structured 
so that voters know which level of government to hold accountable for each 
political decision. Unlike the previous federalism arguments, the accountability 
version of the argument is relevant at the back end of grant enforcement as well 
as at the front end of grant design and acceptance. The argument is that the 
state or locality wants to do X, but the conditions in the federal grant require it 
to do Y. To get the federal funds (at the front end) or avoid losing them (at the 
back end), the state or locality does Y, thereby blurring the lines of accountabil-
ity, in that voters may blame state or local officials for doing Y when it is really 
the federal government that should be held to account for choosing Y as the 
appropriate action.292 This argument is sometimes framed as one particular to 
the states, but not always, and the accountability principle applies to devolu-
tion to sub-national governments more generally.293 
There are at least three problems with the accountability argument against 
funding cut-offs. First, at some level, it makes sense to hold the grantee ac-
countable for choosing to do Y, even in response to an agency threat to with-
hold funds.294 If Y is truly a bad decision, then the grantee should not have 
agreed to do it in the first place. If the grantee has agreed, then it is fair for vot-
ers to express their dissatisfaction with the grantee.295 
Second, recall that grantee noncompliance is not always linked to a compet-
ing policy choice but instead can be rooted in bureaucratic mismanagement, 
insufficient effort, or other problems.296 Where a funding cut-off brings to vot-
 
291. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2660-61 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Blumstein, supra note 250, at 99-100; 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1289-91; Somin, supra note 39, at 484-87. 
292. See Somin, supra note 39, at 484-87. This is typically framed as a story about needing to 
blame the right set of officials for their poor choices, but, of course, we might also want to 
make sure that the right set of officials gets praised for their good choices. See Pasachoff, su-
pra note 14, at 592 & n.91 (noting the NFIB plurality’s apparent failure to consider this latter 
point). 
293. See Davidson, supra note 85, at 1008-17. 
294. Galle, Federal Grants, supra note 39, at 920. 
295. If the state is coerced into making the decision to accept the grant and associated conditions, 
that is another story. But as I explain below, the coercion argument is not promising for 
most federal grant programs. See infra notes 337-342 and accompanying text. If it is just a 
hard choice for the state to make, there is no reason not to hold the state responsible for it, 
just as the state is held responsible for other hard decisions it routinely has to make outside 
the context of federal grants. 
296. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
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ers’ attention instances of this kind of noncompliance, accountability is actually 
increased. 
Third, a threat to withhold funding can be a perfect moment to clarify lines 
of accountability. Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have made the 
more general point that uncooperative federalism—that is, states’ resistance to 
federal control even as they participate in federal programs—invites more ac-
countability, not less, as disagreement produces information that may be rele-
vant to citizens assessing whom to hold responsible for a policy problem.297 
The following scenario demonstrates why this is the case in the context of dis-
putes over compliance with federal grant programs. Imagine a state grantee 
that, perhaps in consultation with the governor’s office, disagrees with the pol-
icy choice in the federal grant, but nonetheless thinks the federal money at 
stake is too important to lose. A sensible political response is a loud and public 
objection to explain to the voters what is going on and to enlist the voters’ help 
in changing the policy. This course of action was easy enough in an era of press 
releases and TV commercials, but it is even easier in today’s era of social media: 
“We [Arizonans, Hoosiers, Californians, etc.] know that X is the right course 
of action for our state. But they [Congress, President Obama, the federal gov-
ernment] want to take it away from us. Call/email/tweet/text/‘Like’/post on 
Tumblr to let them know: we want to do it our way.”298 With a similar re-
sponse from the federal players and with advocacy groups chiming in on either 
side, it is implausible that the threat of a funding cut-off will keep lines of ac-
countability hidden.299 
Withholding funds may also promote political accountability within the 
federal agency more than the alternative of making low-level bureaucratic 
judgments. Because withholding is such a serious action, it must be discussed 
and approved among more senior political players than the civil service grant 
program officers who make run-of-the-mill, day-to-day oversight decisions.300 
Where agency officials receive pushback on their withholding efforts because 
of challenges to the policy or the agency’s interpretation of the policy, the agen-
cy may decide to revise or clarify its policy or interpretation, again making the 
decision more public (and often providing an opportunity for public involve-
 
297. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 40, at 1290-91. 
298. Of course, even technologically easy action is not costless, but the point is that funding cut-
offs need not obscure accountability, not that efforts to publicize which level of government 
is responsible are costless. 
299. To be sure, voters could get lost in competing arguments about which side to blame. But in 
light of the First Amendment’s support of a thriving marketplace of ideas, in which the an-
tidote to disfavored speech is more speech, it would be odd to think that too much speech is 
a negative associated with limited political accountability. 
300. See infra Part II.D. 
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ment through notice and comment or some other mechanism). Withholding 
funds may also permit Congress to weigh in on the substance of the dispute by 
revising the law, whether in support of the agency’s wishes or the grantee’s. Ei-
ther way, withholding can lead to elected officials’ claiming ownership of the 
issue. Far from undercutting accountability, then, withholding funds can actu-
ally enhance it. 
C. The Limits of Agency Motivation and Capacity  
The next two critiques accept that withholding might be desirable as a 
normative matter but contend that practical considerations nonetheless render 
withholding an ineffective tool. The first iteration of this critique suggests that 
agencies have both limited motivation and capacity to make withholding effec-
tive.301 Both elements of this critique are overstated. 
1. Motivation 
The argument that agencies have little motivation to withhold funds asserts 
that grant program offices are designed to give money away, not take it away. 
Agencies provide training and technical assistance and sometimes ask for 
modifications to state plans or discretionary grant applications, but the instinct 
of their personnel is not enforcement-oriented. Instead, agency personnel are 
motivated by the development of professional relationships with grantee staff, 
joined in a common cause relating to implementation of the program at issue; 
often, there is even potential for a revolving door between federal and state or 
local administration.302 Agency personnel may also be reluctant to withhold 
funds if they think that grantees are underfunded to begin with.303 
Further, the argument continues, it is in the agency’s best interest to be in-
volved in the grantee’s program, and terminating the grant means that the 
agency has no more leverage over the policy area in question.304 On the per-
sonnel side, it is typically the grantees that are the strongest advocates for the 
 
301. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 208; Key, supra note 216, at 292-93; King, supra note 
216, at 330-31; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 222, at 620. 
302. See, e.g., KEY, supra note 14, at 175-76; Casino, supra note 54, at 59-60. 
303. See, e.g., Kathleen Sebelius, The Numbers Are In: Sequestration Cuts 57,000 Kids from Head 
Start, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2013 
/08/the-numbers-are-in [http://perma.cc/K7R5-EY93] (blog post from the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services decrying budget cuts to Head Start). 
304. KEY, supra note 14, at 161, 171-72; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 222, at 620. 
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program in the state, and so any action that threatens grantees may be more 
dangerous for the longevity and success of the program.305 
Again, however, the story is more complicated. For example, this story 
seems to encompass only certain kinds of officials, only certain kinds of condi-
tions, and only certain kinds of grants. That is, some agency personnel actually 
are enforcement-oriented—for example, Inspector General offices, whose mis-
sion is in part to investigate and correct problems in grantee service provision 
and administration,306 or agencies’ civil rights offices, whose mission is to en-
force applicable civil rights laws.307 Even grant program offices routinely en-
force administrative conditions, especially financial conditions, which tend to 
be subject to a more routine auditing process.308 Federal officials may well be 
motivated differently based on the institutional norms and perspectives of their 
offices.309 And the story seems also to describe competitive grants less well 
than formula grants, as it may be easier for program officers to see how shift-
ing short-term project grant funds from a noncompliant, unsuccessful grantee 
to an already successful or an up-and-coming grantee could promote the goals 
of the program as a whole. 
Moreover, the story of capture suggested by the revolving door sits in ten-
sion with other plausible explanations of agency action, including tunnel vision 
about the grant’s mission and aggrandizement of the program’s substantive 
goals.310 It also ignores the potential for a revolving door between agency staff 
and non-profit advocacy organizations that might align themselves with feder-
al enforcement over state or local implementation.311 
 
305. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 222, at 620; see also DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 202-
14; Hill, supra note 183, at 14. 
306. See, e.g., supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text. 
307. See, e.g., supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. 
308. See, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
309. Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2324-25 (2006) (discussing competing perspectives 
on the same issue offered by different agencies); Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International 
Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 228-51 
(2011) (analyzing legal offices that focus on international law compliance across different 
federal agencies and demonstrating that “these agencies balance the dictates of law and poli-
cy in different ways based on their particular perspectives”). 
310. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 
101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1351-53 (2013) (describing these claims as part of a broader discussion of a 
“wide range of factors that can influence agency behavior”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administra-
tive Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1925 (2013) (describing these claims while noting 
that agencies are “complicated organizations” with competing instincts). 
311. See, e.g., Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Education Policy and the Changing National Polity for Educa-
tion, 1957-2007, in TO EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL 
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As for reluctance to withhold funds out of a concern that grantees have in-
sufficient funding, noncompliance may emerge from multiple factors that have 
nothing to do with grantee capacity.312 Relatedly, it is surely not uniform feder-
al policy to excuse grantees from compliance with expensive conditions, as it is 
not uncommon for the United States to file amicus briefs in private litigation 
supporting increased grantee compliance, even where compliance is costly.313 
On the question of leverage, the account ignores the real possibility that 
only part of the grant will be at stake,314 so withholding need not mean that the 
agency has lost its ability to influence the program. And since funding cut-offs 
begin as temporary withholdings of funds until the condition in question is 
met,315 an action to withhold even 100% of a grant does not eliminate all lever-
age. To the contrary, the agency’s leverage is perhaps at its strongest the mo-
ment the agency demonstrates its willingness to enforce the grant conditions. 
The absence of leverage arises only if the state refuses to comply and is willing 
to give up the entire grant. But even in that circumstance, the agency’s willing-
ness to withhold funds in one state may increase its leverage in all the other 
states watching what is happening. 
The idea that the state agency program personnel are typically the pro-
gram’s strongest supporters also bears unpacking. To the extent that it is true, 
it could actually increase the federal agency’s apparent willingness to withhold 
funds in a kind of collusive action to provide political cover for strong action 
desired by the state agency personnel; in other words, state agency personnel 
wishing to implement the federal program fully but facing resistance from the 
state legislature or governor may encourage the federal agency to take steps 
toward withholding funds in order to gain a powerful ally.316 But the idea that 
state agency program personnel are the program’s strongest supporters surely 
is not always true. Just as federal agency heads may vary through administra-
 
REFORM 17, 30-33 (Carl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. Lodewick eds., 2007) (describing interest 
groups relevant to the machinery of federal education grants). 
312. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text. 
313. See, e.g., Educational Opportunities Cases, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about 
/edu/documents/classlist.php [http://perma.cc/PD74-GKTR]. 
314. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
316. DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 193-218 (describing methods of federal influence); KEY, supra 
note 14, at 175 (explaining that “many of the instances in which withdrawals have occurred 
have heartily been concurred in by the staff of the state agency affected”); cf. Horne v. Flo-
res, 557 U.S. 433, 448-49 (2009) (describing public officials “under fiscal and political con-
straints” who “frequently win by losing” institutional reform lawsuits, thereby being forced 
to make the change they actually desired all along) (citing ROSS SANDLER & DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 
170 (2003)). 
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tions in the strength or type of commitment to particular projects they oversee, 
so, too, must this be the case for state agency officials. There may be times 
when the agency personnel oppose a given project, and other state players in 
the governor’s office or the state legislature may have more leverage. 
Overall, then, an exploration of the nuances of grant administration weak-
ens the explanatory power of the critique of withholding rooted in a descrip-
tion of agency motivation. Alternatively, to the extent that the critique does ac-
curately describe agency officials’ beliefs, those beliefs ought to be challenged 
as insufficient, and alternative options that redesign agencies to encourage offi-
cials to see withholding as a serious tool ought to be explored, as I discuss be-
low.317 
2. Capacity 
Another aspect of this critique is the observation that agencies have re-
source limitations that constrain their ability to oversee grantees’ work, much 
less engage in a time-intensive withholding process. The number of grantee 
policy and implementation decisions for each program officer to review is vast, 
and agencies simply do not have the resources to police them all.318 Moreover, 
agency capacity may vary from administration to administration, as different 
Presidents may prioritize different programs or have different attitudes about 
agency enforcement overall.319 
It is certainly true that agencies have limited capacity. But this is not unique 
to the remedy of withholding funds; it is a fact that describes essentially all law 
enforcement.320 The assumption that the relevant enforcement goal is a com-
prehensive review of all violator wrongdoing is similarly unsupported; it ig-
nores the possibility of the effectiveness of more strategic321 (or even random-
ized)322 enforcement. And the observation that agencies have limited capacity, 
and that agency officials may feel constrained by that limited capacity, does not 
answer the question whether agencies could be redesigned to make use of their 
limited capacity more efficiently.323 
 
317. See infra Part III.B. 
318. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 222; Hill, supra note 183, at 10-11; Hills, supra note 32, at 1226. 
319. See, e.g., BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 711-13; YUDOF ET AL., supra note 13, at 538. 
320. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9, 13-14 
(2010). 
321. See, e.g., id. 
322. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & David Rosenberg, A New Model of Administrative Enforce-
ment, 93 VA. L. REV. 1983 (2007).  
323. See infra Part III.B (considering design alternatives). 
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But the more relevant question is: compared to what do agencies have lim-
ited capacity? The capacity argument is usually offered in contrast to the value 
of once-flourishing private enforcement of grant conditions, in order to 
demonstrate that agencies cannot possibly seek to compensate for the decline 
in private litigation as a result of the Supreme Court’s cutbacks. A more realis-
tic version of this argument, however, would account for potential benefits of 
agency enforcement and potential drawbacks of heavy reliance on private en-
forcement. 
One upside of agency enforcement is that agencies overseeing grant pro-
grams already have a mechanism for involvement in grant oversight and im-
plementation. The state plans or applications and the monitoring roles of agen-
cy employees mean that agencies already have a way of obtaining knowledge 
about and making change in every aspect of a grantee’s operation.324 Private 
parties can support agencies’ oversight work by raising complaints to the agen-
cy about the grantee’s conduct where necessary,325 but the burden of ensuring 
appropriate grantee implementation need not fall entirely on private parties, 
given the efficiencies associated with agencies’ ongoing monitoring work. In 
addition, since agency capacity varies from administration to administration, 
there are certain times when agency capacity is at a peak. If levels of private en-
forcement are constant across time, agency enforcement may sometimes be the 
better option. 
But even outside the current doctrinal limitations on private enforcement, 
it is important to recognize that some aspects of private enforcement can lead 
to underenforcement. Even where private rights of action exist, lawyers and 
advocacy groups are not evenly geographically dispersed, so there are areas 
where no one is likely to bring a lawsuit (but that are nonetheless subject to 
federal oversight through the grant process).326 Information about potential 
violations is often within the grantees’ own control and is difficult for private 
parties to obtain (but is often nonetheless subject to federal review).327 Even 
 
324. See supra Part I.C; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: 
Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2365-67, 2377 (2010) 
(discussing agencies’ informational capacities to detect potential violators). 
325. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
326. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1424-30 (2011); Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the 
Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 381-82 (1988). 
327. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 326, at 1437-39, 1458 (describing the informational asymme-
tries in the special education context). 
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where private parties are aware of violations, they are often reluctant to sue.328 
Limitations in the attorneys’ fee regime and restrictions on publicly funded le-
gal services create other barriers.329 Furthermore, some grant programs are de-
signed in such a way that even robust private enforcement of the substance of 
the program will lead to systemic underenforcement for more vulnerable bene-
ficiaries (but where public enforcement can play an equalizing role).330 Since 
both private and public enforcement of grant programs have capacity limita-
tions, one might want to find ways to enhance each. Plenty of scholarly atten-
tion is given to the former, which is why my task here is to rehabilitate the lat-
ter. 
3. Motivation, Capacity, and the Special Case of Coercion 
A new version of the motivation and capacity critique of withholding has 
emerged after the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB. In the wake of the deci-
sion, many commentators suggested that the new coercion doctrine would lead 
to a bevy of lawsuits challenging a wide variety of federal grant programs as 
unconstitutionally coercive.331 Commentators also suggested that the primary 
function of the new coercion doctrine would be to strengthen states’ hands in 
negotiations with agencies over the contents of state plans.332 If agencies re-
fused to approve state plans or to grant states waivers from particular condi-
tions, the argument went, states would threaten to bring a lawsuit challenging 
the grant program as coercive. Then agencies, wishing to avoid the danger of 
losing or simply the hassle of a lawsuit, would permit noncompliance. This ar-
gument is related to the threat of funding cut-offs, as an agency with incentives 
to approve inadequate state plans and grant inappropriate waivers in an effort 
to avoid a coercion challenge is surely not going to cut off funds. 
 
328. See, e.g., Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance 
Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1202 (2011); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement 
of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 699 & n.2 (2011). 
329. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest 
Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 62 (2014); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on 
Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1087 (2007). 
330. Pasachoff, supra note 326, at 1488-92. 
331. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 580-81 (describing commentators’ predictions on this 
front); Ilya Shapiro, Like Eastwood Talking to a Chair: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the 
Obamacare Ruling, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 7-10 (2013). 
332. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 920; Ryan, supra note 21, at 19. 
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An agency’s decision to give in to a state’s demands is a choice, however, 
not a necessity, and not at all an obvious one.333 An executive could surely de-
cide that it is preferable to make the better substantive policy decision and face 
the possibility of a lawsuit. A lawsuit, after all, can helpfully clarify exactly what 
the constitutional parameters of the grant program are. The agency might 
therefore rationally prefer to know what is possible rather than act under the 
fear that little is. Moreover, an agency could rationally want to signal to other 
states that it is not going to cave in to all state requests on the theory that a 
hard line can be more effective than a slippery slope. 
Indeed, some months after the Court handed down NFIB, the Education 
Department refused to grant a waiver to California, the largest state by popula-
tion, from the Department’s most heavily funded grant program, No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB).334 California did not sue. Nor did Iowa sue after the Edu-
cation Department denied its NCLB waiver request the week before the deci-
sion in NFIB was announced, notwithstanding the potential new ground for a 
legal challenge.335 The pundits’ predictions, therefore, tell an incomplete story. 
I think this is so for two reasons. 
First, politics matter. It is impossible to tell a story about incentives in 
state-agency-Congress negotiations without contextualizing the actual on-the-
ground politics at the moment of the telling. In the abstract, therefore, it is 
plausible to tell a story of why Iowa should have received its waiver, potentially 
related to the presidential primaries of 2016 or to the Democratic Governor’s 
party-line connection to President Obama’s administration. But in actuality, 
the Democratic Governor and Lieutenant Governor issued statements placing 
the blame for the waiver decision on the state legislature, not on the Obama 
Administration.336 Understanding the negotiations around compliance with 
grant conditions after NFIB thus requires a more fine-grained political analysis 
than the typical account imagines. I discuss the need for nuance in analysis of 
the politics of withholding at more length in Part II.D. 
 
333. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 659-62. 
334. Sharon Noguchi, California Fails to Win Waivers from Restrictive No Child Left Behind  
Education Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 25, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com 
/ci_22255903/california-fails-win-waivers-from-restrictive-no-child [http://perma.cc/5HXM 
-54Q5]. 
335. Alyson Klein, Iowa Turned Down for ESEA Waiver, EDUC. WK.: POLITICS K-12, (June  
21, 2012, 7:35 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2012/06/iowa_turned 
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336. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Iowa Terry Branstad, Branstad and Reynolds Re-
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Second, the legal case for coercion in federal grant programs writ large is 
just not that strong. The structure of the Medicaid expansion that so troubled 
the NFIB Court essentially describes no other grant program.337 Most condi-
tions on grant programs, even with respect to modifications of grant programs 
through reauthorization, easily qualify as merely governing the use of the 
funds to which they are attached, not as leverage for a separate program, thus 
ending the inquiry at the first stage of the new coercion doctrine.338 Even if the 
second stage were at issue, some conditions arguably tying independent pro-
grams together were done with the now-requisite notice.339 But even in those 
circumstances where the first two conditions might not be met, there is no fed-
eral grant program that comes anywhere close to Medicaid in size.340 (And, it 
should be noted, no NFIB opinion suggested that Medicaid itself was so large 
as to be unconstitutionally coercive,341 while the joint dissent seemed to suggest 
that litigants seeking to establish coercion must demonstrate that the “coercive 
nature of an offer is unmistakably clear” and “plain[].”342) Agencies need not 
broadly fear that the grant programs they oversee will be declared coercive 
should an action to withhold funds prompt such a lawsuit. 
For that matter, as I explained above, the Supreme Court found the expan-
sion of Medicaid unconstitutionally coercive based purely on the statutory ex-
istence of a funding cut-off remedy, even in the absence of any agency move 
toward withholding funds.343 It therefore seems that, as long as withholding 
authority remains textually available, an agency could face a coercion challenge, 
no matter what it does. For an agency to avoid withholding funds simply be-
cause it is trying to avoid a coercion challenge thus seems both ill-advised and 
short-sighted. 
As for the idea that coercion lawsuits will, like other lawsuits, be resource-
intensive, and so the agency is justified in attempting to avoid using its limited 
capacity on their defense, granting waivers and negotiating with states about 
 
337. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 582.  
338. Id. at 581-82, 617-21, 633-37, 644-47; Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 910-12.  
339. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 621, 637-39, 647-48. 
340. GAO, supra note 2, at 8 fig.2; see also Ryan, supra note 21, at 17 (suggesting that the Clean Air 
Act, although possibly the hardest case under the new coercion doctrine, could nonetheless 
survive a coercion challenge because, among other reasons, “federal funding provides a 
much smaller role in state transportation regulation than it does in state Medicaid imple-
mentation” and the withholding structure for noncompliance is much more narrowly tai-
lored than the Medicaid withholding structure is).  
341. Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 623. 
342. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2661-62 (2012) (Scalia, Ken-
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modifications to their plans are also time- and resource-intensive. The agency 
might invite fewer requests for questionable modifications and suspect waivers 
if it seems likely to prospective requesters that such requests will be denied. 
Resources spent defending a coercion challenge may actually lead to resource 
savings in other areas. 
Again, then, the NFIB-related account of agency reluctance to withhold 
funds claims too much. Alternatively, once more,344 to the extent agency actors 
really do feel further constrained by NFIB, the assumptions that underlie such 
sentiments ought to be challenged. 
D. The Limits of Politics 
The final critique of the funding cut-off suggests that, regardless of the 
tool’s normative desirability, political dynamics limit its potential.345 The story 
goes something like this: The congressional delegation from the jurisdiction to 
which the funds are directed is likely to respond to lobbying pressure on behalf 
of the jurisdiction.346 The delegation can therefore gain some political capital at 
home by working to resolve a constituent problem. Congress possesses a num-
ber of tools to influence agency action,347 among them the annual appropria-
tions process, which—entirely separate from the amount of funding to be allo-
cated through grant programs—can affect the agency’s own administrative 
budget. Congress can also call in the agency head for a hearing to defend any 
decision to cut off funds, potentially weakening the agency head’s reputation or 
the President’s political standing. Moreover, Congress can change the terms of 
the legislation authorizing the grant program, whether in favor of the com-
plaining grantee on this particular issue or to constrain agency discretion more 
generally. Because these activities can happen in both houses and in different 
committees in each house, the grantee has multiple pressure points to enlist 
Congress’s help against agency action. 
Similarly, the story continues, agency officials are subject to political pres-
sures from the White House and other agencies. Even if an agency wishes to 
cut off funds for a particular program in a state, other agencies may protest 
based on their own programs in that state, and the White House’s response 
may balance those competing interests.348 A less high-minded version of this 
 
344. See supra notes 317 & 323 and accompanying text. 
345. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 195-99 (describing political constraints on funding 
conditions); KEY, supra note 14, at 161-62, 174 (same). 
346. See DERTHICK, supra note 96, at 207-08.  
347. See, e.g., BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 703-25. 
348. See, e.g., id. at 702-03. 
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interaction would involve responding to lobbying by political donors from the 
jurisdiction whose funds are at issue (rather than balancing competing poli-
cies).349 The President may also be sensitive to the political optics of cutting off 
grant funds to a state from which his or her party needs votes in the next elec-
tion cycle. 
The articulation of the incentives in this description holds some appeal, but 
the story is too simplistic to have real explanatory power. In particular, the sto-
ry says little that is unique to withholding; it fails to acknowledge the different 
politics that may surround different types of grants; and it fails to account for 
the complexities of political alignment within the state-agency-Congress rela-
tionship.  
1. General Applicability of the Critique 
The standard account of the political failures of withholding similarly ap-
plies to other enforcement mechanisms at the federal government’s disposal. It 
is not easy for the Department of Justice to sue a state or locality, for example, 
or for any agency to sue or fine private corporations.350 The state can enlist the 
support of Congress and the White House in stopping a lawsuit, after all; pri-
vate corporations can do the same with respect to a lawsuit, fines, or any other 
compliance mechanism. It is no answer that funding cut-offs have a political 
flavor that lawsuits do not. Agencies must set priorities when they decide 
which lawsuits to pursue, and those decisions vary according to the political 
preferences of each Administration.351 Both kinds of actions are embedded in a 
complicated political environment. At the same time, both kinds of actions 
have a legal, as opposed to purely political, basis; just as with decisions to pur-
sue a lawsuit, decisions to cut off funds are the result of noncompliance with 
statutory requirements and made through administrative legal channels.352 The 
political critique of withholding does not explain why the tool is weaker than 
any other tool of federal enforcement. 
The description of the way in which politics stymies withholding could 
even describe many other political problems in Washington, including the pas-
 
349. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1100 
(2013). 
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sage of any piece of legislation. To be sure, this particular moment of partisan 
gridlock is an inauspicious time to suggest that anything can get through Con-
gress. But American history is full of seemingly impossible political outcomes 
prevailing when certain players decide they want to try to change the politics to 
achieve some desired substantive policy. The real question is whether individu-
al political players at any given time think that withholding is a good idea on 
the merits. If that is the case, then particular political strategies to achieve this 
end can be designed with nuance. 
2. Distinctions Among Grants and Grant Types 
The standard account assumes that all grants are embedded in the same po-
litical context. This is simply not true. Grant programs vary in the breadth and 
depth of their interest group support,353 and the power of different interest 
groups varies over time.354 Congress may object more or less to agency efforts 
to cut off funds depending on the likely public response and the importance of 
interest groups’ reactions to individual members’ political futures.355 
Grant programs also vary in the perceived worthiness of their beneficiar-
ies.356 Congress may not object to agency efforts to cut off funds to less sympa-
thetic populations, just as Congress may find it easier to cut budgets for these 
programs in the first place. 
Beyond the political variations with respect to individual grant programs, 
different types of grants are also subject to different political forces.357 For ex-
ample, Congress is likely to object less to agency efforts to withhold funds from 
one-time, short-term project grants than ongoing formula grants. Even within 
formula grants, Congress may be more likely to thwart funding cut-offs for an 
entire state than for a locality because more constituents may object and more 
members of Congress will be affected—although the size of the program likely 
matters, such that Congress may be more likely to look the other way when an 
 
353. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY (5th ed. 2008) 
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agency threatens to withhold funds from a smaller state-wide program than a 
larger one. Furthermore, Congress may be more likely to object to efforts to 
withhold funds from mandatory programs than discretionary ones because 
states may have high expectations that they will receive mandatory grants, 
while discretionary grants are subject to regular reauthorization and annual 
appropriation battles. 
3. Complexities of Political Alignment  
The stylized version of politics in the standard account ignores the poten-
tial complexities in alignments across the 535 members of Congress, 1,100 Sen-
ate-confirmed agency political appointees,358 and innumerable politicians and 
bureaucrats in all levels of government across the fifty states. 
To begin, Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”359 For every home state Senator 
wishing to defend her state’s particular grant funding, there may be another 
who wishes to distance herself from what she takes to be her state’s inadequate 
implementation of the grant program, especially when the Senator is from a 
different political party than the state program administrator.360 For every 
home state Senator who calls in an agency head to embarrass him for with-
holding funds, there may be another Senator who will use the hearing to high-
light her own state’s successful implementation of the program or critique the 
use of federal funds in a poorly run state. Even a home state Senator wishing to 
intervene in an agency’s withholding decision may win the political points she 
desires simply by attempting to intervene, regardless of the strength, serious-
ness, or success of her intervention.361 Furthermore, the interests of Congress 
as a body vary over time along with its membership and its members’ interests. 
The state, too, is a “they,” not an “it.”362 The grantee agency, governor, and 
state legislature (itself comprised of multiple competing political players) may 
not share the same interest in preventing federal withholding if one entity can 
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use withholding against another in the state for political advantage.363 Similar-
ly, grantees at the local level may not always find their interests protected in 
Washington from a unified state-level government or from other local grant-
ees; for example, a state agency may wish to protect its own reputation for 
good administration by agreeing with the federal agency that a local grantee 
ought to lose funds, while other local grantees may wish to protect their own 
reputations for good grant implementation or even obtain the offending grant-
ee’s share of the funds.364 
Interest groups complicate political alignments as well. Members of Con-
gress and the White House may face pressure from non-state interest groups in 
support of increased federal enforcement—sometimes the same groups that 
might have brought a private lawsuit in support of increased grantee compli-
ance in a different doctrinal era.365 
Nor can agency officials be reduced to one predicted set of incentives across 
all agencies, all administrations, and all times. For example, an agency head 
could reasonably decide that taking a hard line on one grant might actually en-
courage the state to make more progress on another grant, just the reverse of 
the political critique told above—but another agency head in a different agency, 
or the same agency at a different time, might make a different call. Relation-
ships matter, and one agency head may be able to convince the White House 
that withholding in a particular case is a good idea, while another agency head 
could not.366 Different facts will also play out differently across different politi-
cal alignments. Imagine some grantee conduct that most people could agree 
was plainly improper—say, taking the grant and then refusing to spend it for 
the purpose of the grant but instead paying for some other purpose at odds 
with federal policy. Even if the state were to activate its political supporters in 
D.C., one could imagine that the agency might carry through with a withhold-
ing action on the principle that the public good should triumph (and/or that it 
will be politically good for those who advocate that principle). 
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Moreover, even separate from the internal complexities of each set of play-
ers, the political dynamics of interactions among the sets of players will change 
depending on who is in the White House, who controls each house of Con-
gress, and who is in power in different states. These dynamics may also change 
over the course of an administration as priorities shift. Additionally, they may 
change differently for different issues at different times. 
Finally, to the extent that the political critique is accurate—in other words, 
that the relevant players in Washington stymie agency efforts to treat with-
holding as a viable enforcement tool—the real question is: what are the under-
lying normative conclusions that drive political opposition to a given withhold-
ing action? If political opposition to a potential agency withholding action is 
rooted in concerns about hurting the program’s beneficiaries and protecting 
federalism values, then we have come full circle, and the substance of political 
opposition may be assessed using the analysis in Parts II.A and II.B above. 
i i i .  rethinking funding cut-offs  
In the previous Part, I argued that the funding cut-off is a more appropriate 
tool than is commonly understood. In this Part, I sketch the circumstances that 
most (and least) invite serious consideration of funding cut-offs. I then consid-
er implications of this argument both for administrative regime design and for 
judicial review. 
A. Circumstances Most (and Least) Inviting Funding Cut-Offs 
To determine the circumstances that might best support agency action to 
withhold funds, it is important to establish the justifications for withholding in 
the first place. As withholding is part of an agency’s enforcement regime, pun-
ishment theory is helpful in this analysis, just as punishment theory has led to 
insights into agencies’ use of civil penalties against regulated entities.367 Inca-
pacitation and retribution, two common rationales for imposing punishment, 
are not appropriate justifications for withholding.368 Part of the rhetoric against 
funding cut-offs discussed above implicitly assumes that these are the only 
 
367. See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (2012) (dis-
cussing potential rationales for penalties levied by agencies as they enforce compliance with 
the statutes under their purview, and reviewing literature); see also, e.g., King, supra note 216 
(describing the withholding of grant funds as “funding penalties”).  
368. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-36, 57-79 (4th  
ed. 2012); Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment [http://perma 
.cc/9D3G-J3WR] (describing theories of punishment). 
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purposes of cut-offs. For example, the argument that withholding hurts bene-
ficiaries maps onto distaste for incapacitating grantees from serving beneficiar-
ies, while the argument that federalism concerns counsel against withholding 
maps onto distaste for being retributive against sovereign states that exercise 
their own policy choices. The underlying suggestion is that, because incapaci-
tation and retribution are not legitimate in this context, neither is withholding 
funds at all. 
But one can agree that these purposes are not legitimate369 without reject-
ing the funding cut-off mechanism entirely. This is where punishment theory 
provides a different, more helpful lens. Rehabilitation and deterrence, two pos-
sible purposes of a punishment regime,370 are appropriate rationales for with-
holding funds. In other words, the purpose of withholding funds should be to 
induce future compliance to better serve the program’s beneficiaries (that is, to 
rehabilitate a previously noncompliant grantee) and to signal to other grantees 
that the agency takes grant violations seriously (that is, to deter other grantees 
from engaging in acts of noncompliance).  
To properly incentivize and deter grantees, some kind of proportionality 
principle would be helpful, under which funding cut-offs are targeted to seri-
ous, rather than minor, violations, and under which cut-offs can be circum-
scribed according to the type of violation at issue, rather than always putting 
the whole grant at risk.371 After all, if the agency is seen to take steps dispropor-
tionate to the violation, backlash rather than increased compliance is likely. Put 
more generally, adopting the framework offered by E. Thomas Sullivan and 
Richard Frase for non-retributive but deterrent and rehabilitative punishment 
goals, withholding may be disproportionate when “the costs and burdens of 
[withholding] (or the added costs and burdens compared to a lesser penalty) 
may outweigh the likely benefits (or added benefits) produced by [withhold-
ing]” and/or when the same goals may be achieved via “less costly or burden-
some means.”372 
Against this background, it becomes clear that certain types of grantee non-
compliance and violations of certain types of conditions better justify with-
holding than others. In contrast, withholding is no more or less appropriate 
 
369. See Minzner, supra note 367, at 904-13 (questioning agency legitimacy, as well as agency 
competence, to impose retributive punishment on entities that agencies regulate). 
370. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 368, at 39-57; Bedau & Kelly, supra note 368. 
371. Cf. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN 
LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 149-53 (2009) (discussing the need 
for coherent proportionality principles “for the nonretributive (deterrent) purposes served 
by fines, forfeitures, and civil penalties”). 
372. See id. at 162-66. 
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based on the type of grant itself, but the agency interest in withholding may 
nonetheless vary according to context. 
1. Rationales for Grantee Noncompliance 
Of the six types of grantee noncompliance I identified above,373 withhold-
ing programmatic funds is likely an inappropriate response to three and possi-
bly appropriate for the three others. 
When noncompliance is of the bumbling administrator variety,374 with-
holding substantive programmatic funds seems to do little to induce compli-
ance—and instead seems to be a disproportionate response. Heightened ad-
ministrative requirements such as those associated with becoming a high-risk 
grantee375 seem more in keeping with the scope of the violation, although tar-
geted withholding of administrative funds might eventually be a proportional 
response376 (if that response better induces compliance). 
 When noncompliance is the result of a conniving administrator’s ac-
tions,377 withholding substantive programmatic funds again seems the wrong 
response. If criminal conduct is at issue, an individual criminal prosecution 
seems in order;378 if non-criminal misconduct is at issue, a response targeted to 
the individual who engaged in the misconduct again seems better matched to 
the violation.379 If the failures of an administrative system permitted the indi-
vidual violations to happen, then high-risk grantee requirements or (eventual-
ly) targeted withholding of administrative funds might be appropriate, but no 
more. 
A move to withhold funds for a grantee’s failure to meet difficult conditions 
that the grantee is working toward in good faith380 would be similarly unrea-
sonable, as such a move will neither induce compliance nor act as a useful sig-
nal to other grantees. But it also does not seem appropriate for the agency to 
merely tolerate grantee noncompliance, as that could send the wrong signal 
about the agency’s tolerance of noncompliance more generally. In these cir-
 
373. See supra notes 139-155 and accompanying text. 
374. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
377. See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text. 
378. See DEMBLING & MASON, supra note 38, at 144-46 (describing the possibility of criminal 
prosecution for individual wrongdoing in the grant context). 
379. See id. at 150 (describing the process of suspension and debarment of individuals from re-
ceiving grants). 
380. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text. 
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cumstances, a public call to Congress to modify the conditions or a transparent 
move to grant waivers seems like a better idea. 
On the other hand, more substantive kinds of noncompliance may justify 
withholding funds—at least if the agency believes that withholding is likely to 
induce compliance. For example, to the extent that the agency determines that 
a grantee’s continued failure to comply is not due to insufficient funds, a fund-
ing cut-off might be appropriate if the grantee fails to comply out of a seeming 
inability to implement the program effectively,381 especially over time. A threat-
ened cut-off can indicate to public officials that a management overhaul is 
needed, while officials in other jurisdictions might well take notice and make 
similar changes in their own management. 
Similarly, if there is a disagreement between a grantee and an agency about 
what compliance requires,382 then a funding cut-off effort, with its administra-
tive process followed by judicial review, may be an appropriate way to resolve 
the question while providing the grantee with a formal means to contest the 
action. Such an effort can also crystallize the issue for congressional considera-
tion, again protecting both the agency’s interest in proper implementation of 
the grant and the grantee’s interest in attempting to influence what proper im-
plementation looks like. 
Finally, when a grantee refuses to comply because of a policy disagree-
ment,383 a move to cut off funds may also be an appropriate response. If grant-
ees were unsuccessful in setting the terms of the agreement both in Congress 
and in the agency (at the regulatory stage), they should not be able to effective-
ly modify the law through noncompliance without consequence; they should 
not get a second (or third) bite at the apple. Once more, agency process, poten-
tially followed by judicial process, potentially followed by congressional pro-
cess, can protect both sides’ interests. 
2. Types of Conditions 
Violations of some types of conditions are more appropriate for withhold-
ing funds than violations of other types. With respect to the subject matter of 
the condition, violations of programmatic, cross-cutting, and crossover condi-
tions seem well suited to withholding of substantive program funds. With-
holding may induce compliance and may act as a signal to other grantees; these 
substantive conditions relate to the central purpose of the grant regime, and 
compliance with them is the whole point of giving away money. In contrast, 
 
381. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
383. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. 
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administrative conditions seem less well suited to substantive withholding, es-
sentially for the same reasons that withholding for noncompliance due to a 
bumbling administrator is inappropriate. But after repeated violations of ad-
ministrative conditions (that is, when administrative controls are not work-
ing), targeted cut-offs of administrative funds (rather than programmatic 
funds) might both induce compliance and act as a signal to other grantees. It 
would also be a proportional response.384 
As to the actor on whom the burden of complying with the condition is 
placed, withholding funds might be more appropriate when the conditions be-
ing violated are placed directly on the grantee or its agents rather than on the 
beneficiaries. If a funding cut-off is designed to induce agency compliance, 
then it should be used to encourage agencies to abide by conditions that are 
within their control. 
As to the kinds of accomplishments that the grant conditions require, 
withholding funds is more likely to be appropriate when the violated condi-
tions are input- or output-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. It is easier to 
redirect efforts and produce desired results when the task is tightly within the 
control of the grantee or its agents. In contrast, because many outcome-
oriented conditions are really policy goals that no one quite knows how to meet 
or accurately measure, funding cut-offs for failure to achieve policy goals will 
in most circumstances do nothing to encourage compliance, but will instead be 
merely punitive. 
The appropriateness of withholding should not vary according to whether 
a grant condition is specific or general, however. Withholding in either context 
can effectively induce compliance and signal seriousness of agency purpose to 
other grantees. 
3. Types of Grants 
Of the dimensions along which I categorized grant types above—including 
whether a grant is mandatory or discretionary, whether it is a formula grant or 
a project grant, whether it is a categorical grant or a block grant, and the 
like385—none clearly distinguishes appropriate withholding from inappropriate 
withholding. No matter where a grant falls along any of these dimensions, an 
action to withhold funds could usefully promote compliance and act as a signal 
to other grantees. 
However, the agency’s interest in withholding funds may vary depending 
on the context. For example, because a block grant is supposed to give maxi-
 
384. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
385. See supra notes 87-123 and accompanying text. 
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mum flexibility to grantees, perhaps the grantor agency will be only moderate-
ly interested in ensuring that grantees are stringently following federal condi-
tions. On the other hand, perhaps because of that very grantee discretion, the 
grantor agency might place great weight on compliance with the few federal 
conditions that are in place. 
Similarly, because withholding for noncompliance with an ongoing cate-
gorical grant may jeopardize longstanding reliance interests or place at risk a 
vast number of beneficiaries, an agency may be reluctant to withhold funds. 
On the other hand, an agency might take compliance more seriously because 
beneficiaries will otherwise suffer without end as a result of the grantee’s poor 
implementation. An agency might be reluctant to withhold funds from a pro-
ject grant of limited duration because of the time and expense of ensuring en-
forcement when the problem will go away of its own accord. On the other 
hand, an agency might find it more important to withhold funds in this con-
text to avoid the appearance or actuality of the grant’s being a slush fund; the 
agency might also find it easy to locate willing and eager new grantees to 
whom the funds can be transferred. 
The appropriateness of withholding cannot be reduced to a scientific for-
mula. Context matters. But agencies ought to consider the type of noncompli-
ance at issue and the type of grant condition that is violated when they consider 
whether withholding is appropriate. 
B. Administrative Regime Design 
If withholding can play a useful role in grant enforcement, several recom-
mendations present themselves in response to the critiques discussed in Part II. 
One set of recommendations is directed to OMB and implicates its reform of 
the federal grants process. A second set is directed to agency grant program of-
fices and addresses organizational design. A final set is directed to Congress 
and concerns fine-tuning the funding cut-off mechanisms in different grant 
programs. 
1. OMB 
First, OMB should include in its grant reform agenda mechanisms to better 
permit the public to call to agencies’ attention grantee noncompliance. This in-
clusion can serve as a way to bolster agency capacity to detect and assess non-
compliance. 
One possibility would be for OMB to require that agency evaluations of 
grantee performance be linked to the information about government spending 
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available on USAspending.gov, the website OMB created pursuant to the Fed-
eral Funding Accountability and Transparency Act.386 In that Act, Congress 
gave OMB authority to specify “any other relevant information” (in addition to 
such basic information as the amount of funding given, the entity to which it 
was given, and that entity’s location) that could help the public track relevant 
information about federal spending.387 OMB apparently declined this oppor-
tunity.388 As a result, if a watchdog group, advocacy organization, or individual 
wants to find out information about a grantee’s compliance (as opposed to 
merely its receipt of federal funds), separate searches of individual grant pro-
gram websites are necessary. These searches are difficult to do, and the relevant 
compliance information is not always readily available.389 
 
386. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. The data underlying USAspending.gov have re-
ceived criticism for a lack of consistency, completeness, and timeliness. See Show Me the 
Money: Improving the Transparency of Federal Spending: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro,  
Comptroller Gen. of the United States), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592592.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/TB3X-8DHH]; Data Transparency: Oversight Needed to Address Underre-
porting and Inconsistencies on Federal Award Website, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE  
(June 2014) [hereinafter Data Transparency], http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664536.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NK8R-PAKD]; Keeping Tabs on USASpending.gov, SUNLIGHT FOUND., 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/clearspending [http://perma.cc/W6DU-QGSN]. The web-
site holds great promise, however, and OMB both continues to direct users to the website, 
see OMB, FY15 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 252, and has ordered specific steps 
for agencies to undertake to improve their presentation of the data on the website, see Jason 
Miller, OMB Sets New Deadlines to Improve Data on USASpending.gov, FED. NEWS RADIO, 
June 20, 2013, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/513/3364282/OMB-sets-new-deadlines-to 
-improve-data-on-USASpendinggov [http://perma.cc/LV76-TC6X]. Congress, too, has 
committed to ensuring the success of this website, through its recent amendments to the 
Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act. See supra note 75 and accompanying 
text. Although the recent amendments shifted operational control to the Treasury Depart-
ment, OMB retains authority to work with Treasury to set the requirements and provide 
guidance to agencies on the submission of data to the website. See id.; see also Data Transpar-
ency, supra, at 28-29 (making recommendations to OMB in its ongoing oversight of the 
website). 
387. Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2(b)(1)(A)-(F), 120 Stat. 1186 (2006). 
388. See Learn About USAspending.gov, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/learn 
?tab=About%20the%20Site [http://perma.cc/U5R7-SUNM] (listing only the statutorily re-
quired aspects of the information on the website and not mentioning OMB’s discretionary 
authority to specify other information). 
389. For example, information about states’ compliance with the IDEA is buried in a non-
obvious location under the Education Department’s website for the Office of Special Educa-
tion Programs, and even there, the compliance information appears only in formal letters to 
each state that do not permit easy comparison between grantees. See Part B State Performance 
Plans (SPP) Letters and Annual Performance Report (APR) Letters, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/partbspap/allyears.html [http://perma.cc/K95K 
-RYU6]. This compliance information is easier to find than that for food stamps or welfare, 
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Requiring links to actual information about compliance would help effec-
tuate the accountability and transparency goals of the Act, goals Congress reit-
erated in its recent amendments to the Act.390 It would also be in keeping with 
a recent presidential memorandum directing agencies to provide “[g]reater dis-
closure of regulatory compliance information” as a mechanism to “foster fair 
and consistent enforcement of important regulatory obligations” by “encourag-
ing the public to hold the Government and regulated entities accountable.”391 
To that end, including compliance information on the government’s main re-
pository for grant spending information could also end up galvanizing cut-offs 
where appropriate, if the public uses the compliance information to express in-
terest in further federal enforcement. That is, to the extent that agencies are not 
taking steps to withhold funds because they think the public would object, or 
because they are in a technical assistance mode rather than in an enforcement 
mode, it might be a useful development for agencies to hear other voices en-
couraging them to take stronger action.392 
 
however. Nowhere on the homepage of the Food and Nutrition Service at the Agriculture 
Department is there an obvious location to click to locate state compliance with SNAP. See 
Food & Nutrition Serv., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S.  
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-
snap [http://perma.cc/4YYM-L273]. The website for the Office of Family Assistance in 
HHS’s Administration for Children & Families includes a link to a page presenting caseload 
data, expenditure data, work participation rate data, and some other information by state, 
but there is no apparent information on state compliance. See Office of Family Assistance, 
Data & Reports, ADMIN. CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa 
/programs/tanf/data-reports [http://perma.cc/G3BZ-YUTD]. Now imagine overlaying 
compliance with cross-cutting requirements on this grantee information. The Education 
Department’s Office for Civil Rights has recently begun putting online a selection of its res-
olution agreements with individual grantees, see Office for Civil Rights, Recent Resolutions, 
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/index 
.html [http://perma.cc/VVV2-4UEM], but this information is limited. Moreover, every 
agency has its own Office for Civil Rights, see Eloise Pasachoff, Advocates, Federal Agencies, 
and Special Education Law, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 461, 473 n.74 (2014); Federal Co-
ordination and Compliance Section, Agency-Specific Civil Rights Information, U.S.  
DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/fedagencies.php [http://perma.cc/Y44U 
-64RW], and there is no easy way to track civil rights violations across all agencies by grant-
ee. 
390. See Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146 
(2014). 
391. Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 32 (Jan. 21, 2011); 
see also Andrias, supra note 349, at 1105 (urging construction of a similar kind of database to 
track and make public corporate compliance with direct regulatory efforts). 
392. Cf. Hehir, supra note 213, at 231-37 (discussing the value of the public’s engagement with 
agency oversight of special education grants to prompt further agency action); Pasachoff, 
supra note 389, at 471, 486-87 (expanding on this argument). 
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Another possibility would be for OMB to require that agencies provide an 
opportunity for the public to comment on grant applications, particularly on 
states’ submission of proposed state plans under formula grants. Despite the 
importance and extent of these programs, there is no formalized government-
wide mechanism for citizens to voice concerns about states’ implementation of 
grants and provide feedback to federal grant offices about whether to approve 
new state plans or ask for revisions, much less whether stronger federal en-
forcement via funding cut-offs or otherwise is desired. Currently, some indi-
vidual grant programs require that each state submit its proposed plan to the 
public for comment,393 but there is no requirement that states pass comments 
on to the federal agency, that federal agencies have a mechanism to receive such 
public comments directly, or that organizations in other states have the oppor-
tunity to address best practices and compliance problems across states. 
This is again a lost opportunity for federal agencies to receive important in-
formation about grantee compliance at a moment when withholding of federal 
funds could be particularly effective. Mechanisms for feedback need not be as 
formal as the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking,394 so review-
ing feedback would likely not tax agencies or delay their decision-making to 
the same extent that the notice-and-comment process is often thought to.395 
Instead, agencies could simply expand their use of social media, whether wel-
coming blog comments, requesting Facebook posts, creating a wiki for collabo-
rative editing, or some other means, to invite direct comments from beneficiar-
ies and the general public about the grantees’ proposals. Many agencies are 
already using these tools,396 and the Administrative Conference of the United 
 
393. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300x-51 (2012) (specifying public comment at the state level for state 
plans under a federal block grant for community mental health programs).  
394. Indeed, as indicated supra note 49, the APA specifically exempts the category of grants from 
these requirements. Although many agencies have, to different degrees, waived this exemp-
tion, see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2012); 36 Fed. Reg. 2531 (Feb. 5, 1971), others have re-
voked that waiver, see, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 64194 (Oct. 28, 2013). 
395. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Os-
sification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012) (challenging Yackee and Yackee’s con-
clusion that ossification is not serious or widespread); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume 
and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012) (reviewing literature suggesting 
that the notice-and-comment process contributes to the ossification of agency rules and de-
lays in action, and challenging that literature). 
396. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Using Social Media in Rulemaking: Possibilities and Barriers,  
ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 15-20 (2013), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Herz 
%20Social%20Media%20Final%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/XSU5-6EFZ] (describing 
agencies’ use of social media more generally). For two examples of the Department of Edu-
cation’s solicitation of feedback as it develops grant priorities, see Additional Public Comment 
Sought for Preschool Development Grants Competition, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: HOMEROOM  
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States has promoted their use in rulemaking;397 a directive from OMB on the 
grant-making front would bring these tools into further use and provide help-
ful information to agencies on whether enforcement action would be useful 
and well-received.398 
2. Agency Grant Program Offices  
Second, agencies ought to consider ways to restructure their internal con-
trols to improve their capacity and motivation to enforce. If grant program of-
ficers feel reluctant to take money away, rather than give it away,399 one possi-
bility is to redesign grant program offices so that, instead of dividing 
responsibilities only by geographic area, responsibilities are split by task—
separating out grant administration and technical assistance on the one hand 
from review and enforcement on the other. Internal agency separation of pow-
ers can mimic some of the values of checks and balances that are promoted by 
the Constitution’s separation of the three branches of government.400 In fact, 
Congress has at times recognized the importance of the distinction between 
programmatic implementation on the one hand and investigation and en-
forcement on the other. The rise of Inspector General offices effectuates this 
distinction.401 So does the creation of state Medicaid fraud investigation offices 
 
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2014/03/additional-public-comment-sought-for 
-preschool-development-grants-competition [http://perma.cc/XE3H-LFSH]; and Results 
Driven Accountability Effort, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: HOMEROOM, http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012 
/07/results-driven-accountability-effort [http://perma.cc/SR9T-PJND]. 
397. Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-5: Social Media in Rulemaking, ADMIN. CONF. 
U.S. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Social%20Media 
%20Rec_Final_12_9_13.pdf [http://perma.cc/KK7-QYKD].  
398. Of course, OMB should encourage agencies to be thoughtful as they design and implement 
programs to solicit feedback. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: 
Judging and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123 
(2012) (offering principles for balancing “‘more’ and ‘better’ participation” in “‘Rulemaking 
2.0’ civic engagement systems”); Herz, supra note 396, at 89-92 (summarizing recommen-
dations for best practices in agency use of social media in rulemakings). 
399. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text. 
400. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 895-906 (2009) (advocating the redesign of pros-
ecutors’ offices to separate tasks that might be seen as investigative from tasks that might be 
seen as adjudicative, in order to avoid prosecutors’ becoming invested in pursuing cases that 
ought not be pursued).  
401. See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2008) (establishing “inde-
pendent and objective units” to “conduct and supervise audits and investigations” in federal 
agencies’ programs); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL 
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run separately from the state agencies that are tasked with implementing Medi-
caid.402 
Another complementary possibility is to tweak the professional incentives 
for grant program officers so that taking steps toward cutting off funds is not 
disfavored as a matter of course. This recommendation responds to the sugges-
tion that there are no current professional incentives for grant program officers 
to move forward with serious enforcement actions.403 One can imagine chang-
ing these incentives to support the possibility of funding cut-offs, however. 
Separating out enforcement tasks from technical assistance and support is one 
step in this direction, as changing the job description changes the metrics for 
success on the job. Other changes are also plausible, including agency awards, 
positive stories in the agency employee newsletter, or formal notations in per-
formance reviews relating to the seriousness of a program officer’s enforcement 
efforts. 
This is not to say that measures of funds taken away would be an appropri-
ate metric; that would promote destructive incentives. My defense of funding 
cut-offs is not designed to suggest that the mechanism should be used cavalier-
ly. But program officers’ investigations and recordings of grantee violations, 
written evaluations of the pros and cons of moving to a funding cut-off in any 
given situation, and the like ought to be part of the officers’ job responsibilities. 
Such heightened enforcement attention should not weaken program offic-
ers’ or political appointees’ future job prospects should they seek to move to 
state agencies.404 If the federal government steps up enforcement efforts, the 
people with inside familiarity with those efforts are exactly the people the states 
should want to hire.405 
Notably, neither of these recommendations for restructuring grant pro-
gram offices and internal agency incentives requires any influx of financial 
 
AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993) (discussing the history and value of Inspec-
tors General). 
402. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (2012). 
403. See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text. 
404. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
405. Cf. Ben Protess, Slowing the Revolving Door Between Public and Private Jobs,  
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 11, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013 
/11/11/slowing-the-revolving-door-between-public-and-private-jobs [http://perma.cc/HGS 
-PCUS] (noting the fact that “[t]he last six S.E.C. enforcement chiefs have moved on to top 
corporate firms and big banks” as an example of the broader phenomenon of former federal 
regulators going to work for the “institutions they once policed”). 
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support.406 The first proposal relies on the same number of program officers 
but simply divides up their responsibilities differently, and the second proposal 
does not involve any monetary incentives. While I believe that increased federal 
appropriations would be desirable, both for enforcement purposes and for the 
substance of many grants, in the current economic and political climate, such 
an influx is not likely forthcoming. Reliance on internal agency restructuring 
therefore seems like a more realistic and achievable suggestion. 
3. Congress  
Third, Congress should codify the proportionality principle I recommend-
ed in Part III.A in order to make the funding cut-off a more palatable tool. 
That is, where not otherwise specified in a given grant statute, Congress 
should consider specifying the percentage of funds that might be lost for par-
ticular violations. Congress can impose a series of intermediate financial penal-
ties, restricting the scope of the program that would be affected by a cut-off or 
adopting other options that might make the threat of a funding cut-off more 
realistic. As an initial matter, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS) might take on the task of reviewing and categorizing types of 
statutory funding cut-offs and recommending a series of best practices,407 just 
as earlier in its history the Administrative Conference offered a series of inter-
mediate steps that agencies should take before imposing a funding cut-off.408 
One might question why such intricate specificity will be useful, given 
agencies’ general authority under OMB requirements to withhold in part for 
most grant programs,409 as well as the statutory limitations on withholding 
that already exist in others.410 As to the first point, guidance from Congress 
would provide a more bounded context within which agencies may feel em-
 
406. Contra Moncrieff, supra note 324, at 2380-81 (arguing that agencies need “bigger staffs and 
more funding” to enforce their statutes more effectively). As Samuel Bagenstos has noted, 
Abigail Moncrieff’s solution may be “wholly unrealistic.” Bagenstos, supra note 222. 
407. See Paul R. Verkuil, What the Return of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
Means for Administrative Law, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 17, 23-25 (2012) (describing rec-
ommendations adopted by ACUS based on empirical studies). 
408. See Recommendation 71-9: Enforcement of Standards in Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs, ADMIN. 
CONF. U.S. 4 (1971), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/71-9.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/GF73-LHJN]; see also Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 222 (providing rationales 
for ACUS recommendations). 
409. See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text. 
410. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text. 
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powered to make use of their discretion.411 As to the second point, thoughtful 
deliberation about how to target across programs would make sense as a mat-
ter of policy. Why should some provisions give no guidance to agencies on 
when and how much to cut off funds,412 while others are very precise413 or in 
the middle?414 Further, why are other agency withholding decisions limited on-
ly by judicial interpretation, not statutory language?415 Program-by-program 
examination of cut-off provisions can shed useful light on policy prioritization, 
again promoting accountability in the use of federal funds. 
One might also question why such a limitation is desirable, given the 
premise of my argument that funding cut-offs can be a useful tool to induce 
grantee compliance. Why weaken the very tool I am promoting? The answer is 
that such a limitation would not weaken the tool at all. The point of more nar-
rowly targeting what is at stake in a funding cut-off would be to make it a less 
draconian and therefore more desirable mechanism for agencies to use. Grant-
ees will feel that the mechanism is both less punitive and more likely to be 
used; the grantees may therefore be more likely to comply with the conditions 
at issue. 
It is, of course, possible that grantees may decide that, with fewer funds at 
stake, non-compliance is more desirable. In other words, grantees might treat a 
partial withholding as a fine and simply incorporate the potential fines into the 
cost of doing business. Narrowing the scope of the funding at stake would 
nonetheless be beneficial on the whole. If the agency does move forward to cut 
off the more narrowly focused funds, there will be less fallout for innocent 
beneficiaries in that state (to the extent the concern about innocent beneficiar-
ies has merit), since more of the grant funding will remain intact. 
In addition, it is already the case that grantees may decide to avoid compli-
ance with particular conditions, either by seeking waivers from the agency for 
the conditions with which they would rather not comply or by simply not 
complying and assuming that there will be no repercussions. The first of these 
options does not always result in a granted waiver, as I explained above, and 
 
411. Cf. Hehir, supra note 213, at 229-30 (arguing that a grant office’s new statutory authority to 
withhold partial funding makes actual withholding more likely). 
412. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7165 (2012) (providing no guidance on enforcement of the Safe 
and Drug-Free Schools and Communities grant). 
413. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 609 (2012) (specifying in detail which violations of state block grants 
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are subject to particular degrees of withhold-
ing). 
414. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e) (2012) (specifying, with much discretion left to the Secretary, a 
set of general circumstances in which certain amounts of withholding might be an option 
under the IDEA). 
415. See Title VI Manual, supra note 198, § XI.C.2 (discussing the pinpoint provision). 
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frequently grantees will have to decide whether to elect the second of these op-
tions, which does not promote political accountability at all. To shift the bur-
den to Congress to articulate different levels of possible funding loss would in-
stead return some of the focus to that politically accountable body. 
C. Judicial Review 
What, then, of judicial review of agency decisions to cut off funds? Courts 
tend to review such decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, unless the particular grant 
program specifies otherwise.416 This standard is notoriously capacious.417 If 
agencies were to commence a more serious program of inducing state and local 
grantee compliance through funding cut-offs, protesting state grantees might 
well begin to develop an argument for heightened judicial review of such ac-
tions on federalism grounds—a type of super-hard-look review that seems 
congruent with the federalism clear statement rules now in vogue in statutory 
interpretation418 and with scholarly suggestions that courts review agency deci-
sions that burden state interests with greater scrutiny.419 Local grantees might 
attempt to make this case as well, either through their roles as sub-grantees of 
states420 or by claiming direct applicability of federalism-based arguments to 
local governments.421 
 
416. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 508 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 2007) (using this standard for the 
Federal Highway Administration’s decision to withdraw federal highway funds from a city 
project); Massachusetts ex rel. Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs. v. Sebelius, 701 F. 
Supp. 2d 182, 196-97 (D. Mass. 2010) (discussing arbitrary and capricious review of the 
HHS Secretary’s decision to disallow federal Medicaid funds that the state had already 
spent). For an example of a grant regime specifying another standard of review, see 7 C.F.R. 
§ 276.7(j) (2014), which provides for de novo review of decisions to withhold funds from 
state agencies that oversee the food stamp program. 
417. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, 
and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1818-20, 1823-29 (2012). 
418. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619-29 (1992); see also Gluck, 
supra note 227, at 601-13 (discussing the idea of a “Chevron for the states”). 
419. See, e.g., Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, supra note 42, at 2104-07; see also 
Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 
1023-25 (2014) (identifying and criticizing this trend on other grounds). 
420. Cf. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (involving school districts 
that raised a clear statement challenge as sub-grantees of state recipients of federal funds). 
421. Cf. supra notes 255-257, 274-279 and accompanying text (discussing the application of feder-
alism doctrines to localities and not just states). 
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Above, I suggested three rationales for grantee noncompliance that might 
support an agency’s decision to withhold funds: recurring failure to comply 
out of an apparent inability to implement the program effectively; disagree-
ment between a grantee and an agency about how to define compliance; and 
refusal to comply in protest of the federal policy at issue.422 Heightened judicial 
review on federalism grounds would be inappropriate in all three contexts 
(even setting aside the question of whether local grantees are justified in at-
tempting to claim the argument for themselves).423 
As to the first rationale, if an agency’s decision to withhold funds is due to 
the grantee’s ineffective management, no real federalism issue is at stake at all. 
Where the grantee has made no policy choice but simply fails to use best efforts 
to satisfactorily implement terms it has willingly accepted, there is no reason 
for a court to review the agency’s decision with a thumb on the scale in support 
of the noncompliant grantee. 
As to the second rationale, if an agency’s decision to withhold funds is due 
to disagreement over what constitutes compliance, the federalism clear state-
ment rules, particularly the notice requirement placed on federal funding con-
ditions, will already provide adequate protection for federalism values. The 
premise of the notice requirement is that “legislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract,” and that states should not 
be held responsible for complying if they did not “voluntarily and knowingly 
accept[] the terms of the ‘contract.’”424 Courts have been quite expansive in de-
termining the scope of the notice requirement, requiring, among other types of 
notice, that grantees have notice of how the substantive rule applies to particu-
lar facts.425 Courts have also been quite restrictive in determining which details 
provide the requisite notice. The Supreme Court, for example, has rejected 
even a clear statement in a congressional report as providing state grantees 
with adequate notice of their obligations because the statutory text itself could 
accommodate another reading.426 The breadth of the notice requirement means 
that interpretive ambiguities over what grantees must do to satisfy their grants 
 
422. See supra notes 374-383 and accompanying text. 
423. See supra notes 255-257, 274-279 and accompanying text. 
424. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Nat’l Fed’n of  
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (plurality opinion) (relying on 
Pennhurst). 
425. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 14, at 397-401 (discussing the pre-NFIB notice requirement); 
Pasachoff, supra note 14, at 600-05 (analyzing the notice requirement in NFIB). 
426. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006).  
  
the yale law journal 124:248   20 14  
332 
 
will likely be resolved against the agency.427 If the grantee’s understanding of 
what constitutes compliance is reasonable, then, any move to withhold its 
funds cannot be sustained, even without any heightened federalism-inflected 
arbitrary-and-capricious review. 
As to the third rationale, if an agency’s decision to withhold funds is due to 
the grantee’s decision not to comply in protest of the policy, federalism con-
cerns are both implicated and not already protected by the federalism clear 
statement rules. But a federalism-inflected version of arbitrary-and-capricious 
review is still not appropriate. The point of more heavily scrutinizing agency 
decisions that burden state interests is to ensure that agencies adequately take 
these interests into account.428 In the context of a withholding decision, how-
ever, the grantee’s interest will have already been taken into account. In part 
this is a result of the distinction between rulemaking, the administrative con-
text in which calls for heightened judicial review in the service of federalism are 
usually made,429 and adjudication, the administrative context in which with-
holding decisions take place. That is, there is little chance that grantees will not 
appear and press their case, most likely through counsel, in the process of the 
agency hearing, not to mention the much earlier process of negotiating over 
compliance. This situation contrasts the generalized process for agency rule-
making, in which state interests are merely one voice among the many the 
agency must take into account. In the adjudicatory context of withholding, the 
grantee’s voice is the key voice. Ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious review per-
mits assessment of the agency’s action without any special federalism-based 
rule of judicial review. 
Beyond the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking, however, 
states (and local governments) are in a different posture when they are the reg-
ulated entities than when federal policy simply implicates their interests. Be-
cause federal policy in the former instance depends on state and local grantees 
for implementation, they play a critical role in the legislative process, setting 
the terms of the grant statute; in the regulatory process, further developing 
those terms; and in the grant application and compliance process, commenting 
on the application requirements, submitting and revising applications, and 
working regularly with federal officials who have responsibility for grant over-
sight.430 This is not to suggest that states and localities always get their way—
 
427. See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(en banc) (“If there is textual ambiguity and a plausible state-friendly way to read the stat-
ute, that ends the matter.”). 
428. See Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, supra note 42, at 2100-01. 
429. See id. at 2100-07. 
430. See RYAN, supra note 40, at 316-31; Gluck, supra note 227, at 595-96. 
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nor would that be possible, even under heightened judicial review on federal-
ism grounds—given the multiplicity of inter- and intra-state (and -locality) in-
terests involved,431 but merely that there is little need to place additional bur-
dens on agency withholding decisions to better protect federalism values. 
Finally, recall the politics of withholding decisions. I made the case above 
that the critique of funding cut-offs based on the limits of politics is overstat-
ed,432 but that is not to discount the ways in which grantees may attempt to 
lobby members of Congress and the White House to temper agency efforts to 
withhold funds and to attempt to change the substantive policy in question. A 
formal agency decision to withhold funds likely has survived significant politi-
cal pressures against it. One need not accept the argument that politics general-
ly provides an adequate safeguard for federalism433 or that agencies are able to 
protect federalism values as a general matter434 to accept the more limited ar-
gument that the interests of federalism will be adequately protected in any giv-
en case of withholding in light of the broader decisional context. 
Any argument in favor of heightened review of withholding decisions on 
federalism grounds ignores the way in which federalism values are already pro-
tected throughout the entire process leading to withholding. 
conclusion 
Funding cut-offs can be an enormously effective tool to induce compliance. 
Yet while agencies have long been reluctant to cut off funds for noncompliance 
with grant conditions, the rationales used to explain or defend their reluctance 
are insufficient. Where a funding cut-off will encourage change in the non-
compliant grantee and act as a signal to other grantees that they ought to in-
crease their own compliance with grant conditions, a funding cut-off can be a 
force for good without interfering with federalism values. Under these circum-
 
431. See supra notes 358-366 and accompanying text. 
432. See supra notes 345-366 and accompanying text. 
433. Compare, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (ar-
guing that courts need not police the boundaries of federalism because the political process 
is sufficient to do so), and Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safe-
guards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (accepting Wechsler’s claim but offering 
a different take on which political processes provide sufficient protection), with, e.g., Lynn 
A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE 
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434. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delega-
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stances, when informal enforcement mechanisms are not working, agencies 
can, and should, take the possibility of funding cut-offs much more seriously. 
The funding cut-off as enforcement mechanism is not the only aspect of 
the federal grants regime that deserves more attention in legal scholarship. The 
grants regime differs from more commonly studied aspects of the regulatory 
state in a number of ways.435 For example, as to the legislative process, a large 
subset of grant statutes, unlike most other statutes, are subject to regularly 
scheduled reauthorizations and modification.436 As to the regulatory process, 
grants are categorically exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act’s re-
quirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking,437 while grants are nonethe-
less implemented through agency action that includes regulation.438 As to cen-
tralized executive oversight, grant regulations receive less scrutiny from OMB’s 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs than do traditional regulations,439 
while other offices within OMB, such as the Office of Federal Financial Man-
agement, play a heightened role.440 Understanding and evaluating the ration-
ales for as well as the effects and implications of these legal distinctions are 
subjects worthy of further study. In 1991, lawyers affiliated with the American 
Law Institute and American Bar Association wrote a practice guide on federal 
grants, explaining that “the grant institution is little understood.”441 The 
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statement remains true today. It is long past time to bring this institution 
squarely into the field of administrative law and understand it better. 
 
